# Pine Crest---Round 5

# 1AC

## 1AC—Cuba Alternative Energy

### 1AC – Hemispheric Energy Advantage

#### ADVANTAGE ONE—HEMISPHERIC ENERGY—engagement with Latin America is low now – puts US energy security at risk.

Dr. Nancy E. Brune, 7-26-2010, works on energy security and national security issues at Sandia National Laboratories, a Truman National Security Fellow, as well as a member of Women in International Security and the Pacific Council on International Policy, “Latin America: A Blind Spot in US Energy Security Policy,” <http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=250:south-of-the-border-americas-key-to-energy-security&catid=108:energysecuritycontent&Itemid=365>

For more than a decade, America’s relationship with Latin America could most accurately be described as unfocused engagement, driven by reactions to events or crises at best and benign neglect at worst. Apart from intermittent efforts to secure free trade agreements (NAFTA and CAFTA), combat drugs (Plan Mérida and Plan Colombia), and weigh in—often too late and too sheepishly—to political events (Honduran Presidential crisis or President Hugo Chavez’s saber rattling), the US has failed to engage the nations of resource-wealthy Latin America in any strategic manner. This lack of attention to our closest neighbors—and some of our strongest allies—is quite alarming given US dependence on Latin America to provide our energy. Currently, more than one-fourth of imported oil comes from Latin America (and almost 50% from the Western Hemisphere). In 2009, the top sources of US imported crude oil (and their percentages) were Canada (21%), Mexico (11%), Venezuela and Saudi Arabia (9% each), Nigeria (7%), Russia (5%), Iraq, Algeria and Angola (4% each), Brazil (3%), Colombia and Ecuador (roughly 2% total). As is widely known, America imports more than 65-70 percent of its energy needs, which means that we are vulnerable to disruptions in the supply chain and to price volatility, which are affected by domestic political and economic conditions in oil-exporting countries upon whom we depend. In 2007, speaking at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, ”[W]e are eager to expand our cooperation on energy with more [Latin American] countries […]. Our goal should be nothing less than to usher in a new era of inter-American security in energy.” In June 2009, President Obama pledged to engage with Latin America on issues of energy, security and trade, and attended the Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad & Tobago. But very little has happened in the last fifteen months. The Administration’s blind spot to the importance of Latin America in our energy security matrix is revealed by the disappointing fact that, during Secretary of State Clinton’s visit to Ecuador in June 2010, her almost 4,500 word policy address on ‘Opportunity in the Americas’ contained no mention of energy—not a single word. While our government takes for granted the oil wealth of Latin America, several domestic factors in the resource-rich countries in the region threaten US energy security. Mexico, which replaced Saudi Arabia as our 2nd largest supplier in 2008, is by no means a stable supplier of fuel. Years of inadequate investment in the national oil company Petróleos de Mexico (Pemex) have resulted in falling production rates; production output of crude oil fell 17.5 percent during the period 2004-2008. Although the Mexican government approved a broad set of oil sector reforms in 2008, including the establishment of a new regulatory body (the National Commission on Hydrocarbons—CNH), actual implementation of the reforms—viewed by many as ‘timid’—is behind schedule, thus having no impact on reversing the downward trend in production output.

#### Specifically – other countries are forming energy relationships with Latin America now – inaction disrupts US energy supply lines.

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Domestic political and economic turmoil—violence, falling production and nationalization—in Latin America are not the only factors increasing the risk to America’s long term energy security. Sadly, while US engagement with Latin America has reflected muddled, short-term unilateral objectives, other countries—like China, Iran and Russia—recognize the strategic importance of Latin America and are building broad relationships in very systematic, aggressive ways. These new alliances between our Latin American neighbors and several countries that are frequently hostile to American interests may also disrupt our stable and secure access to energy resources. Russia is widely recognized as using its vast natural resources as a political weapon and holding countries hostage by manipulating access, control and distribution of the energy resources. Russia has also been quite active in building strategic relationships with several resource-wealthy countries to enhance its own long term energy security. When Russia’s reach was limited to Eastern Europe, it was easy for the US to stay on the sidelines of Western Europe’s diplomatic and political battles with Russia. Now the situation is not as ambiguous. In September 2009, Russia and Venezuela announced several cooperative agreements on energy, defense and trade, including a commitment to supply Venezuela with almost $4 billion in weapons. PDVSA signed two agreements with a consortium of energy giants in Russia. While production and investment are years away, a Russia-Venezuela joint venture has the potential to disrupt our supply lines. As is well known, China’s grand strategy has been shaped by its desire to secure surety of energy supplies to fuel its continued industrialization. In 2008, China spent $100 billion in Latin America, most of this on hydrocarbons, energy and mining. China has had a growing presence in Venezuela since 2003 after helping PVDSA recover from a prolonged labor strike. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has been operating Venezuelan oil fields in the Zulia and Anzoategui provinces for years. Reciprocally, PVDSA has maintained a representative office in China since 2005. In April 2010, China announced a $900 million heavy crude production project with Venezuela. To sweeten the pot, the China Development Bank signed a financing agreement to loan Venezuela $20 billion. Just prior to that, in neighboring Brazil, a country that sits on vast pre-salt oil reserves, China’s Sinopec and the China Development Bank signed a strategic development pact with Petrobras, Brazil’s state-owned oil company, whereby China agreed to provide financing to the tune of $10 billion in Petrobras over the next five years. Leaving no corner unturned, China also has operations in Ecuador. In 2006, Andres Petroleum, a consortium of Chinese oil companies, purchased the Ecuadorian assets of the Canadian firm, EnCana for $1.42 billion. In return, CNPC gets oil and control over the controversial Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados (OCP) pipeline. Iran has also been cozying up to Venezuela and Brazil, as well as a number of Andean countries. In 2007, Venezuela and Iran signed three petroleum cooperation agreements which involved bilateral investment in Iranian gas and Venezuelan oil fields and Venezuelan gasoline exports to Iran. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad traveled to Brazil and met with President Lula last November. Lula then traveled to Iran in May 2010 during which time the two countries discussed future trade in Brazilian ethanol. It was also reported that Brazilian energy firms—including Petrobras—were exploring possible deals to provide training and technology to modernize the Iranian energy sector. To support its strategic positioning in the region, Tehran has set up branches of its Export Development Bank in Brasilia as well as Caracas. Bolivia and Ecuador also enjoy cozy relations with Iran. Even India, whose appetite for hydrocarbons is almost as voracious as China’s, recognizes the strategic importance of Latin America. For example, hydrocarbons dominate trade relations between India and Mexico: oil accounts for 90 percent of Mexico’s exports to India. The Indian government recently proposed establishing a sovereign wealth fund for the sole purpose of purchasing hydrocarbon reserves around the world. India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) has exploration and production stakes in projects in Brazil and Colombia and is exploring opportunities in Venezuela. In 2006, ONGC Videsh Ltd. (the overseas investment arm of ONGC) joined with the Chinese firm Sinopec to acquire a 50 percent stake (for a combined $850 million) in the Colombian oil firm Omimex de Colombia.

#### The plan is key to Latin American alternative energy development – only engagement with Cuba removes negative perceptions of the US in the region and provides the technological expertise to diversify.

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At present Cuba possesses an estimated 4.6 million barrels of oil and 9.3 TFC (total final consumption) of natural gas in North Cuba Basin. This is approximately half of the estimated 10.4 billion barrels of recoverable crude oil in the Alaska Natural Wildlife Reserve. If viewed in strictly instrumental terms—namely, increasing the pool of potential imports to the U.S. market by accessing Cuban oil and ethanol holdings—Cuba’s oil represents little in the way of absolute material gain to the U.S. energy supply. But the possibility of energy cooperation between the United States and Cuba offers signiﬁcant relative gains connected to the potential for developing production-sharing agreements, promoting the transfer of state-of-the art technology and foreign direct investment, and increasing opportunities for the development of joint-venture partnerships, and scientific-technical exchanges. The relative gains from increased commercial and technical cooperation obviously increases Cuba’s domestic energy capacity, but it also possesses the potential of enhancing the United States’ energy security by deepening its links in the region. The future vitality of energy security requires access to energy export markets but also the diffusion and dispersion of technology, innovation, research and development of enhanced productive capacities, alternative energy technologies, and the effective management of resources across the region. The economist Jeremy Rifkin argues that “distributive energy markets,” marked by highly collaborative efforts to integrate diverse energy resources based in various proportions everywhere, will come to replace the prevailing model of the highly concentrated, conventional energy elites—coal, oil, natural gas, uranium—which are now found in limited geographical regions and are ﬁnite.5 The development of Cuba as an energy partner will not solve America’s energy problems. But the potential for improving energy relations and deepening collaborative modalities with other regional partners is enhanced by pursuing energy cooperation with Cuba for two principal reasons. 1. Cuba’s increasing leadership role in the Caribbean region and Central America might be used by the United States to promote collectively beneﬁcial efforts to develop a broad range of alternative energy technologies in the Americas. A Cuba-America partnership might also serve as a conﬁdence builder in assuaging the misgivings on the part of regional partners regarding American domination. 2. Cuba’s significant human capital resources in the scientific and technological arena have been grossly underused. Cuba possesses the highest ratio of engineers and Ph.D.s to the general population of any country in Latin America, and this can been viewed as a key asset in the challenge of maintaining energy infrastructure across the region. Both Mexico and Venezuela face significant costs in maintaining their sizable energy production, refining, and storage capabilities. The integrity of these two national energy systems is of paramount interest to U.S. energy security concerns because of the potential harm to the economy that would occur if either state were unable to deliver its exports to the American market.

#### Engaging Cuba opens the door for hemispheric cooperation on alternative energy development – strengthens US energy links in the region.

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Because of recent developments in Cuba and the growing investments being made there made by regional partners, in particular Venezuela and Brazil, the importance of Cuba’s energy development objectives becomes decidedly more pronounced, in terms of both Cuba’s national development priorities and the United States’ energy and geostrategic priorities.9 One of the recommendations made in Rethinking U.S.-Latin American Relations is especially relevant: developing sustainable energy resources. The report recommends that the United States, in partnership with other governments in the hemisphere, establish a “Renewable Energy Laboratory of the Americas” that would promote hemispheric cooperation on developing solar, wind, and cellulosic-biomass technologies; intensify hemispheric cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and promote regulatory regimes that are open to private energy investment and trade in energy technology and services.10 In a special section on U.S.-Cuban relations, Rethinking U.S.-Latin American Relations makes two other recommendations: “Promote knowledge and reconciliation by permitting the federal funding of cultural, academic, and sports exchanges; and encourage enhanced official contact and cooperation between U.S. and Cuban diplomats and governments.”11 The authors go on to articulate a set of steps or best practices that would serve to foster such a partnership and, more important, provide a set of measures open and flexible enough to account for the complexity and specificity of issues that surround energy development. In closing with a special section on Cuba, the report puts the spotlight on the centrality of the island nation and the effective management and potential leadership that it may offer in the effort to deal with these issues. While expanding the ambit of U.S. geostrategic interests in the region, it is critical that the discussion include the role Cuban energy development will have on the assessment and pursuit of those interests. Cuba faces daunting policy challenges in the twenty-first century. Chief among them is the task of providing reliable sources of energy for economic development and revitalization in the post–cold war milieu.

#### Hemispheric energy engagement solidifies US regional ties – secures American access to energy

Eric Farnsworth, 4-11-13, Vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society, “ENERGY SECURITY OPPORTUNITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,” <http://www.as-coa.org/articles/energy-security-opportunities-latin-america-and-caribbean>

Mr. Chairman, if I may give you the bottom line first: energy security for the United States is of fundamental strategic importance. It underlies our ability to function as a modern society, and ensuring energy security has long been a critical component of U.S. foreign policy globally on a bipartisan basis. It is within this context that we firmly believe the nations of Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada must be considered, leading to a new and abiding appreciation at the most senior levels of government of the strategic importance of the Western Hemisphere to the United States. The region cannot be an afterthought or taken for granted. Already, just over half of U.S. energy imports come from the Western Hemisphere, meeting approximately one quarter of our daily energy needs. Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela are three of our top suppliers worldwide. We receive more than twice as much energy from Canada, our top supplier, as from Saudi Arabia, our second largest supplier. Colombia, Ecuador, and Brazil also contribute significant amounts. Even when political relations are troubled with certain countries, for example Venezuela and Ecuador, the United States continues to engage in energy trade on a commercial basis. At the same time, a dramatic expansion of new energy resources across the hemisphere made possible by new technologies including ultra-deep water drilling offshore and biofuel production and fracking onshore has created the possibility of a new, highly favorable paradigm for hemispheric energy. Herein lies the primary opportunity for regional partnership, if we are nimble enough, collectively, to grasp it: working together as a hemisphere to increase energy security for all parties in a manner that lowers costs through increased production and greater efficiencies, encourages sustainable economic growth, development, and job creation, and supports a clean energy matrix with appropriate environmental protections. In fact, energy partnership was one of the key initiatives at the 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami, at the insistence of Venezuela, and was one of the deliverables coming out of the 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago. Changing sector dynamics make the vision truly compelling, to the extent that regional political challenges can be minimized or overcome. At the same time, the United States is not the only nation that sees the potential for cooperation in Latin American, Caribbean, and Canadian energy. China, which is now the world’s top energy consumer, is a relatively recent but very active participant in the development of regional energy resources, as are other nations such as India and Russia, a trend that we expect will continue and also accelerate into the indefinite future. This is a region that is now in play and in my view, the United States must do a better job making the case for regional partnership because alternatives for the region exist today which simply did not exist a decade ago. A strategic approach to the hemisphere with energy at the core should be at the top of our agenda. Developing Effective Regional Energy Markets Is Vital to U.S. Interests Any discussion of hemispheric energy must take as its point of departure the dramatic changes in the industry, particularly on the production side, that have occurred in just the past few years. These changes have broad implications for shifting patterns of energy trade and regional development. By now the story of exploding U.S. production and the potential for energy self-sufficiency is well known. The United States is now the world’s largest producer of natural gas and could become the world’s largest oil producer by 2020. Estimates suggest that the United States could actually be a net exporter of energy by 2035, a remarkable historical shift. At the same time, the region’s energy demands are increasing as economic growth has produced a new middle class with higher expectations for an improved quality of life. No longer can the hemisphere be easily if simplistically divided into consumers (the United States) and producers (everyone else). This is a game changer. Old patterns no longer hold and the Western Hemisphere must be seen in a new light. Still, energy markets are global, and the more energy available overall, the better for everyone because that reduces the cost and therefore increases competitiveness. At the same time, greater production by any one country changes its terms of trade, increases investment, stimulates technology transfer, and builds management expertise. When pursued with a broader vision, increased energy production can also contribute to sustainable, environmentally-sound economic development. It is on this basis that partnerships can be pursued with willing partners. The reality is that the Western Hemisphere is rich in natural energy resources. Latin America already boasts the world’s cleanest energy matrix, due in large measure to a reliance on hydropower and the purposeful development of biofuels. Developing clean, renewable energy resources is a regional priority, and meaningful additional projects in wind and solar are underway. Nonetheless, traditional fuels will remain critical to meet both regional and global energy needs for the foreseeable future, and here, too, Latin America and the Caribbean boast significant resources. The region is energy rich. Unfortunately, politics including populist governance and regional rivalries between states, and a sub-optimal investment climate in a number of nations—specifically including a weak and malleable rule of law—has led to sectorial underdevelopment and unnecessary inefficiencies. Of course, there is nothing more politically fraught in some Latin American and Caribbean countries than national energy policies. These matters strike at the very core of nationalist sensitivities in ways that North American observers cannot easily appreciate. These are sovereign nations with long histories and memories, and the natural resources sector is often ground zero in the national and local discourse, a short-hand, highly symbolic political proxy in nations which lack strong democratic institutions that would normally be expected to channel and address the challenge of competing political interests. These issues go a long way to predicting which nations will be more and which will be less receptive to meaningful energy partnership with the United States.

#### Now is the time – renewed US energy linkages with Latin America are key to energy security – alternative energy’s key.

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In many ways, the fate of Latin America and the US are strongly linked. This is no less true with our energy security interests. At this time, the US needs to move past the rhetoric and take concrete measures to direct resources, capabilities and even some creativity into building a stronger, strategic relationship with our neighbors in Latin America in order to address our long term security needs. How do we do this? First, the United States should commit sufficient financial, human and technological resources to making the Energy Climate Partnerships of the Americas (ECPA), formed in April 2009 at the Fifth Summit of the Americas, a viable, strong enterprise. The ECPA supports initiatives that focus on energy efficiency, renewable energy, cleaner fossil fuels, critical infrastructure and energy poverty alleviation. However, regional experts note that there has been little progress. While energy security can be strengthened by making progress in these areas, the US needs to broaden the scope of the ECPA to explicitly discuss issues of energy security (including physical security of energy infrastructure), market-enhancing regulatory frameworks, as well as energy integration—one of the region’s greatest challenges—which affects price stability and supply networks. Latin America has frequently launched regional entities with the objective of improving energy integration and collaboration. Among these are the Regional Electrical Integration Commission (1964), the Latin American Reciprocal State Oil Assistance Association (1965), the Latin American Energy Organization (1973), and Initiative for Regional Infrastructure South American integration (2000). As recently as 2007, the South American Energy Council was established. However, the overwhelming consensus is that energy integration and coordination among Latin American nations remains limited and that these institutions have been ineffective, largely because they could not overcome the challenges associated with asymmetrical regulatory frameworks, policy coordination and implementation of rules and procedures. In their recent piece in Foreign Affairs, David G. Victor and Linda Yueh conclude that (global) energy governance requires “a mechanism for coordinating hard-nosed initiatives focused on delivering energy security and environmental protection." The US, a country with strong institutions and regulatory bodies, must take a leadership role to ensure that ECPA avoid the fate of previous regional energy initiatives by articulating clear mechanisms for making decisions and resolving conflicts, establishing performance metrics, coordinating policies across countries, and monitoring and evaluating outcomes. In other words, the US, as author of the ECPA initiative, has the added responsibility of guaranteeing its success. The energy security of the US and of our Latin American partners cannot afford another failed effort to manage the region’s energy problems. If successful, the ECPA could serve as a model of regional, and possibly global, energy governance, replacing the international and national institutions that are “struggling to remain relevant.” Second, the US must leverage the opportunity presented by the creation of the ECPA to strengthen and expand strategic, bilateral energy arrangements with our resource-wealthy neighbors, just as China, Iran, Russia and India are doing. America should not view ECPA as a substitute for bilateral arrangements, but as a long-overdue occasion to jump start relations and create bold, new partnerships. To this end, the US should remove the $.58 tariff on imported Brazilian ethanol, a policy measure which has paralyzed efforts to move forward on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on biofuels, signed by Brazil and the US in 2007, in which the two countries expressed an intention to cooperate in research and the production and export of ethanol, with the goal of developing a global biofuels’ market. The current landscape is ripe for technological partnerships which should provide the cornerstone of strategic, bilateral energy partnerships. According to EIA’s World Energy Outlook of 2007, Latin America needs to invest approximately $1.3 trillion in overall investment in its energy sector by 2030. Moreover, the potential for renewable energy production “has remained unexplored due to engineering difficulties, environmental concerns and lack of investment.” America’s technological expertise—wielded by our private sector companies, research institutions and unique configuration of national laboratories—could assist and support strategic partnerships between the US and our Latin American neighbors. These sorts of strategic collaborations could enable the Western Hemisphere to become the global behemoth in renewable energy and biofuels, an area in which we are quickly losing ground to China. America stands at a crossroads. On the one hand, we can continue our muddled, reactive engagement with Latin America. Or, we can forge a bold new vision of collaborative engagement to strengthen our energy security and manage the region’s energy problems. Our global counterparts recognize that the countries south of the border are critical to their energy security interests. Will America?

#### Independently, US-Cuba energy cooperation is key to US energy security.

Juan A. B. Belt, 5-06-2009, Director of the Office of Infrastructure and Engineering at the U.S. Agency for International Development, “The Electric Power Sector in Cuba: Potential Ways to Increase Efficiency and Sustainability,” <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADO407.pdf>

Investments in alternative energy Energy security has vaulted to the top of both the U.S. and Cuban political agendas amid concerns about supply interruptions and rising prices, sparking a renewed search for viable alternative fuels. For the USG, an important element of an effective energy strategy from both cost and environmental perspectives lies in forging technological and open trading relationships in the Western Hemisphere. For the GOC, upgrading the island’s decaying energy infrastructure and promoting alternative energy sources are national security priorities referred to as the ‘‘energy revolution.’’ GOC officials indicated to staff that they are particularly interested in wind power, while other renewable energy projects are receiving support from the United Nations Development Program, which maintains an office in Havana and finances, among other projects, household solar photovoltaics and hydro power for use in rural areas. In addition, the GOC is encouraging foreign investment to develop its oil fields, with probable hydrocarbon reserves of five billion barrels, according to estimates by the United States Geological Survey—significant for Cuban energy consumption and comparable to the oil reserves of Ecuador. In staff’s meetings, GOC officials particularly welcomed U.S. participation in renewable energy development. If restrictions were lifted, U.S. technology could help ensure environmentally-sustainable development of Cuba’s energy sector. Most importantly, cooperation in this area would be consistent with long-term U.S. interests in energy security and efficiency in the region.

#### US energy insecurity causes global conflict and instability – alternative energy provides a key cushion.

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Toward a Long-Range Energy Security Policy Events in recent decades have produced a broader definition of security.1 The entry of phrases like “environmental security,” “resource conflict,” and “energy security” into the lexicon of security experts provides examples of this changing dialogue, but these concepts remain on the margins of the discussion for the most part. Where US energy policy is concerned, the debate generally has been limited to arguments that the United States must preserve its access to the oil reserves of the Middle East and Central Asia, and a vague sense that domestic energy supplies would be highly desirable. Cornucopian optimists continue to insist that oil will remain abundant and cheap for the foreseeable future, and indeed more concern is expressed over the unsavory character of governments in major oil-producing states than over the finite nature of the resources themselves. The vagaries of oil politics (and the ecological problems raised by carbon emissions) are indeed serious problems, and they are not entirely separable from the questions this article means to raise, but the focus here will be on the problem of fossil fuel scarcity at the global level. This article seeks to provide an overview of the situation, including the prospects for an economy based on renewable energy, the security problems likely to result from tightening oil supplies, and a possible basis for making the transition to alternatives widely acknowledged as inevitable in the long run. The Outlook for Energy At the time of this writing, the price of oil has hit $70 per barrel and is projected to rise even higher in the near term. While not a record when the figure is adjusted for inflation, this was still commonly taken as a sign that the era of “cheap energy” may be coming to an end. Other numbers bear this out. Annual worldwide oil consumption is roughly 29 billion barrels a year, and estimated to be rising at two percent annually.2 While there is widespread disagreement over their actual size, the world’s total “proven” reserves of oil come to roughly one trillion barrels. A linear projection has oil supplies running out around 2030 after a long period of rising prices and tightening supplies, likely to begin after production peaks, generally expected to be sometime between 2010 and 2020—maybe just five years away. The consequences of a shortfall in oil supplies on the scale of such predictions are as obvious as they are terrifying. A prolonged economic contraction and possibly a desperate scramble for resources that might bring major powers to blows are not out of the question, especially when the cost of other problems likely to place more pressure on the energy base (climate change, water shortages, population growth, etc.) are taken into account.3 In the absolute worst case, modernity might simply grind to a halt, a catastrophe that James Howard Kunstler describes in his recent book on the subject, The Long Emergency. Of course, linear projections have their limitations, and any number of developments could throw them off—unanticipated changes in the character of economic productivity, or an economic slowdown, for instance. Actual oil reserves are likely larger than the proven figure, which would delay the crunch for some years. Rising energy needs will mean higher prices and shorter supplies, which will stretch out the supply by encouraging conservation.4 They also will produce increased efforts to supplement oil with more plentiful coal, “heavy oil,” and natural gas. The degree to which these alternatives can pick up the slack, however, is a subject of intense disagreement, as all these resources will mean higher energy prices.5 Moreover, they do not eliminate the problem of the finite amount of these resources, with natural gas reserves particularly unlikely to last all that much longer than oil. In short, the oil age may end within a generation given the present economic picture, with potentially dire consequences. The prospects of alternatives to fossil fuels are therefore the key issue, such as the expanded use of nuclear energy or, ideally, renewable energy sources. Many observers predict that it will be decades at the very least before these inherently more difficult energy sources can be exploited on a sufficiently large scale to meet the needs of advanced societies. The use of renewables has expanded rapidly in recent years, but these energy sources still supply only a small part of overall consumption, even in leaders like Denmark, where wind energy provides 10 to 15 percent of that country’s electricity. If anything, given the scope of the problem and the length of time for which it has been around, the pace of actual progress has been frustratingly glacial. While the pace may be accelerating, a gap between desired levels of energy output and those actually attainable through these means is conceivable. Nonetheless, the doomsday scenario posited by Kunstler and others is not a necessary outcome. The problem is not that substitutes do not exist, but that they are, in the view of many analysts, too expensive or too unwieldy to support desired levels of economic productivity and living standards. There is little doubt that there would be some significant transition costs, as there are in every major economic change. Observers hostile to these technologies, however, routinely play on popular fears that any change in the status quo will force Americans to give up their cars, or kill economic growth. Their exaggerations aside, such arguments conveniently neglect the fact that the exhaustion of oil resources in an unprepared world will be incalculably more devastating than any plausible adaptation, and that the earlier the transition begins, the easier it will be to spread the costs over time. More important, such analyses tend to suffer from three major deficiencies that exaggerate the difficulties involved with alternatives. The first is that calculating the costs and benefits of oil against other energy sources is far more complicated than studies pointing to the cost-ineffectiveness of renewables admit. Many costs of fossil fuel use are easily externalized, distorting the picture. The cost of pollution, military expenditures aimed at securing oil sources, and other kinds of subsidies mask the actual price of “cheap” oil—as do the very low gasoline taxes Americans enjoy.6 Certain savings from the distributed energy production that renewables might allow, while potentially substantial, are not easily or automatically factored into such calculations.7 Moreover, solar, wind, and other sources will become relatively less expensive as oil prices rise. And it also should be noted that many experts regard wind power as already competitive with fossil fuels in some geographically favorable areas. The tendency to underestimate the gains that alternatives may bring is reinforced by a broader tendency to stress costs more than benefits, not only on the part of oil industry boosters, but generally due to the changing nature of political debate.8 The potential for a rapid changeover also tends to be underestimated, observers forgetting that comparably large transformations have happened before in a relatively short period of time. Oil became cheaper than coal only in the mid-1950s, a mere 50 years ago. As a result, coal went from generating 100 percent of Europe’s thermal electricity to less than half by 1973, oil picking up much of the slack even as overall energy production grew substantially.9 The second problem with such predictions is their built-in assumption that the relevant technologies will be static. Future improvements cannot be taken for granted, but are a near-certainty nonetheless, given the prolonged drop in the price of solar- and wind-generated energy since the 1970s, and the prospects for both continued research and development and mass production. The already low price of wind power can drop further still, given the potential of innovations like flying wind generators. Capable of exploiting the jet stream and returning the electricity to the ground through a tether, a few clusters of six hundred each could meet the entire energy needs of an industrial nation like Canada.10 There are even strong indications that electricity produced by photovoltaic solar cells will, assuming sufficient effort, become competitive in price with even subsidized, deceptively cheap oil and gas in a matter of years rather than decades. This may be due to new, low-cost materials; designs which use a greater part of the electromagnetic spectrum; more efficient use of their surface area; easily installed, self-assembling liquid solar cell coatings; and architectural structures maximizing output.11 Several of these developments could be flashes in the pan, something to which energy production has sadly been prone; for half a century fusion power has been “30 years away.” Nevertheless, given the long-term trend of improvement and the number of directions from which the problem is being attacked, some approaches will likely pay off. A third problem is the tendency to view the matter as a choice between the outright replacement of fossil fuels or nothing at all. The reality, however, is that partial solutions can provide a cushion until a more complete transition can be brought about. This being the case, it matters little if renewable energy production will at first be undergirded by more traditional supplies. Solar cells and wind turbines will be made in factories powered by oil-burning plants. To state this as proof that alternatives to oil are unrealistic is nonsense. The energy base of the future will have to be created using the energy base existing now, just as the oil-based economy was built using previously existing sources. Of greater concern, many schemes for a hydrogen economy involve the extraction of hydrogen from natural gas or other fossil fuels, with power supplied by traditional electricity sources like oil, coal, and nuclear generators. Hydrogen, however, also can be extracted directly from water through photoelectrochemical processes or electrolysis, which could be powered by cheap wind and solar energy.12 The problem, then, is less the “technical ingenuity” needed to produce these technologies than the “social ingenuity” which will implement the technologies on a national and global basis.13 Renewable energy technology can potentially do the job; what is really at issue is whether or not good use will be made of that potential. Nonetheless, the political problem posed by the demise of the fossil fuel era is not limited to the challenge of constructing a new energy base. Security Concerns Even without taking into account related problems like the greenhouse effect, the security problems posed by the exhaustion of supplies of easily accessible, cheap oil and gas are highly varied and daunting. The likely result would be the exacerbation of familiar problems like resource conflict, weapons proliferation, and state failure. However, other problems are more novel, not least of all the potential for changes in the international balance of power based not only on which countries control the lion’s share of the world’s fossil fuel supplies, but which are most dependent on those supplies. New Resource Wars The most obvious concern is a reinvigoration of resource conflict. As the oil deposits believed to lie under a disputed piece of ground or sea floor become more valuable economically, governments might be more prepared to fight for them. Since the War on Terrorism began in 2001, China, seeing itself in a more vulnerable strategic position, has been more willing to negotiate its claims over the South China Sea.14 However, the issue has yet to be resolved, and an oil-hungry China can yet take a harder line, especially if this becomes more profitable. China also has behaved provocatively elsewhere, sending naval vessels into Japanese claims around the Senkaku Islands.15 Similar conflicts remain unresolved in other regions, including sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.16 Moreover, even states unlikely to go to war over territory would face greater prospects of involvement in an armed conflict, and find a powerful incentive to develop and deploy long-range power-projection capabilities. Resource wars also can be a cause of internal conflicts or unrest. The war in the Indonesian region of Aceh is partly driven by the government’s determination to hold onto an oil-rich region, and the resentment of the inhabitants has been partly a response to the damage oil production has done to local communities. Oil also was at stake in the fight over East Timor, which on the first day of its independence concluded a deal with Australia regarding its oil-rich offshore claims. The problem may in fact be exacerbated by certain solutions to the world’s energy problems. To give one example, the development of new technologies which permit cost-effective drilling for oil in deeper waters could create new flash-points. Cheaper deep-water drilling, for instance, would make the oil under the South China Sea a more valuable prize.17 As certain kinds of alternative energy technologies are developed, the value of certain resources is also likely to become more strategically important (like platinum for hydrogen fuel cells), with similar results. As the situation stands, two-thirds of what were the high seas in 1958 have been “territorialized” to some degree. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea extended territorial waters from three to 12 miles, recognized 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones and 350-mile continental shelf claims, and permitted the enclosure of the internal waters of archipelagic states like Japan.18 At the same time, the mineral wealth of these regions has remained largely unexploited. While the ambitious ocean mining schemes of 30 or 40 years ago amounted to little, rising energy costs and improved technology could give them a future—and make the right to profit from them a new cause of conflict. Increased Disorder Resource conflict, however, is likely to be confined within particular regions. The economic effects of an oil shortage would be global. With less energy at their disposal, societies and governments everywhere will have more difficulty coping with problems likely to be of a more severe character—burgeoning populations, climate change, and shortages of such critical resources as water and arable land. The problem of the salinated and damaged farmland on which a third of the world’s crops is presently grown is a case in point. Aside from expensive repair, costly methods like drip-irrigation will be needed to keep such lands arable, necessitating more, not less energy.19 Another likely ramification of such an energy shock is a new wave of debt crises and state failures. As in the 1970s, those most vulnerable would be developing nations short on hard currency and dependent on oil imports, which might see their development progress strangled by a spike in prices. If the prospect of 2050s America resembling a Mad Max movie is far-fetched and extreme, it is not so for less fortunate regions where such regressions have already happened, as in Somalia.20 Lacking appropriate or adequate capital, institutions, and technical knowledge, their situations will much more readily degenerate to the point of collapse.21 And, as events in recent years have demonstrated, advanced nations will not easily insulate themselves from these problems, given the refuge for criminal activity and terrorism such areas will provide, as well as the waves of refugees they may generate. It may even be possible for practitioners of a radical ideology to seize power in a major state. Even without that happening, we could see an inward turn on the part of major powers seeking to establish self-contained economic empires, as happened during the Great Depression.

#### Energy shocks spark US lash-out and national outrage – causes global wars.

King 2008 (Neil, Wall Street Journal analyst regarded as being in the “economic mainstream,” whose involvement as an analyst has enhanced greatly the credibility of peak oil concerns, “Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns,” Center for a New American Security Working Paper, September 08, <http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISN&fileid=7D4B6FDF-1951-EBEC-FA16-8A86D1F74087&lng=en>)

In the United States, the prospect of diminished oil supplies and skyrocketing prices raises fears of recession, ebbing international status, and a transformation of the American way of life. In the big developing countries of Asia—above all China— the same prospect evokes images of mass unrest and the denial of potential superpower status. No country has been more determined than China over the last decade to assure that its rapid rise isn’t tripped up by a lack of energy. In Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Iran, and across Central Asia, the Chinese government and Chinese state companies are going to extraordinary lengths to build infrastructure, create alliances, and sew up oil contracts. The ultimate aim is to lock in a number of long-term exclusive arrangements with suppliers in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia that would give China the assurance it seeks that no supply disruption will derail its economic ambitions. China’s quest to build a major deep-sea naval force, analysts say, is driven in part by its desire to protect critical sea lanes like the Strait of Malacca, through which all Asia-bound Middle East oil must pass. The Defense Department, in its more recent report on the “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” said that beyond Beijing’s usual fixation on Taiwan, an “analysis of China’s military acquisitions and strategic thinking suggests Beijing is also developing capabilities for use in other contingencies, such as conflict over resources.”5 The Bush administration has also cast an increasingly wary eye on Russia’s myriad efforts to tighten its energy grip over Europe, particularly when it comes to Europe’s increasing dependence on imported natural gas. Beyond its own abundant supply routes to Europe from its own territory, Russia’s Gazprom is now busy working to lock down supply arrangements from the Caspian, Iran, and North Africa. The recent fighting in Georgia has highlighted Western Europe’s vulnerabilities on the energy front. A key energy conduit, Georgia is home to the only oil pipeline outside of Russian control that can move the oil riches of the Caspian region to markets in the West. In the first week of its August war with Georgia, Russia dropped bombs within feet of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and took down a railroad bridge that carried Kazak crude to the Georgian port of Poti. At the same time, many of the recent fulminations in Congress over Saudi Arabia’s alleged unwillingness to boost its output illustrate that a strong sense of resource entitlement continues to live on within the U.S. political establishment. While Rep. Ros-Lehtinen demands heatedly that the Saudis pump more oil to help commuters in Miami, she also opposes calls to open Florida’s Gulf coast to oil exploration. Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whether soaring oil prices and market volatility could spark an outright oil war between major powers—possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. “Energy security is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter,” he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University.6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, “is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system.”7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the financial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price. A breakdown in trust for the oil markets, these analysts fear, could spur calls for government action—even military intervention. “The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.”

#### Those conflicts go nuclear.

Islam Yasin Qasem 2007, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and Social Sciences at the University of Pompeu Fabra (UPF) in Barcelona, MA in International Affairs from Columbia, July 9, 2007, “The Coming Warfare of Oil Shortage,” online: <http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_islam_ya_070709_the_coming_warfare_o.htm>

Recognizing the strategic value of oil for their national interests, superpowers will not hesitate to unleash their economic and military power to ensure secure access to oil resources, triggering worldwide tension, if not armed conflict. And while superpowers like the United States maintain superior conventional military power, in addition to their nuclear power, some weaker states are already nuclearly armed, others are seeking nuclear weapons. In an anarchic world with many nuclear-weapon states feeling insecure, and a global economy in downward spiral, **the chances of using nuclear weapons** in pursues of national interests **are** high.

### 1AC – Plan

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase its joint alternative energy development with Cuba.

### 1AC – Diversification Advantage

#### ADVANTAGE ONE – DIVERSIFICATION – Cuban alternative energy development fails now – increased investment is key.

Andrea Rodriguez, 7-05-2012, Correspondent for the Associated Press in La Habana, Cuba, “Cuba's Renewable Energy: Gov. Missing Out On Solar, Wind Power Opportunities, Experts Say,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/05/cuba-renewable-energy-alternative-solar-wind\_n\_1651216.html

Cuba is proud of its success in using alternative energy to bring electricity to isolated hamlets like Ramon Gordo, 90 miles (150 kilometers) west of Havana. Some 2,000 schools and at least 400 hospitals are lit up by solar panels in rural areas not plugged into the national grid. But scientists say the island, blessed with year-around sunshine and sea breezes but plagued with chronic energy shortages, could be doing much more on the national level, and that its communist government is missing a golden opportunity to reduce its dependence on subsidized oil from uber-ally Venezuela, where President Hugo Chavez is sick with cancer. It is vital that Cuba expand its energy horizons "so it doesn't remain at the mercy of political changes in the region that could affect it adversely," said Judith Cherni, an alternative energy expert at the Imperial College London Center for Environmental Policy. The urgency to find alternative energy sources was driven home last month when an exploratory offshore oil well drilled by Spanish company Repsol turned out to be dry, a setback to Cuba's hopes for a big strike that could be a boon for the limping economy, though exploration continues. Despite recent essays by revolutionary hero Fidel Castro on impending global catastrophe due to climate change, Cuba gets just 3.8 percent of its electricity from renewables, a pittance even by regional standards and far behind global leaders. In the nearby Dominican Republic, where a 2007 law establishes tax breaks for investment in alternative energy, renewables account for 14 percent of electrical generation. Germany, the gold standard for high-tech green energy, gets 20 percent of its considerably larger electrical consumption from renewables, mostly from wind. The reality in Cuba today is that wind and solar energy sources are almost exclusively for local consumption and there has been little attempt to expand them to augment the national grid, which is powered mostly by fossil fuels. Scientists say the country lacks the investment and expertise for such a move.

#### Diversification of the Cuban energy supply is key to economic growth – but oil dependence is high now.

Ivet González, 3-04-2013, reporter for Inter Press Service, international communication institution with a global news agency at its core, raising the voices of the South and civil society on issues of development, globalisation, human rights and the environment, “Cuba Diversifies – But Energy Focus Still on Oil,” <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/cuba-diversifies-but-energy-focus-still-on-oil/>

But the need to diversify the energy supply is increasingly seen as a priority in Cuba’s current economic reform process. The province of Cienfuegos has begun to tap renewable energy sources, the head of the provincial government, Mairelys Pernía, told IPS. A one megawatt solar park is being built in the province, where there are other projects in the pipeline as well, Pernía said. The Centre for Local Development Studies (CEDEL) is preparing training sessions for municipal authorities to learn about the alternatives and achieve a more sustainable energy mix. According to CEDEL researcher Ricardo Berriz, this step forward is “essential for development planning in the country.” The government institution is currently working with 20 of Cuba’s 168 municipalities, which are discussing what energy sources they could harness, depending on local conditions, he told IPS. “If we move towards a more diverse energy mix, our country will not only be more independent in terms of energy, but we will solve many environmental problems as well,” he said. To illustrate, he mentioned biodigesters that turn animal waste into clean energy and can be incorporated into production chains. Half of Cuba’s energy needs are covered by crude oil and natural gas extracted from land wells and shallow water wells. The rest, nearly 100,000 barrels per day, is imported from Venezuela. In 2011, only 3.8 percent of the electric power generated in Cuba came from renewable sources.

#### That makes Cuban growth impossible – renewables are key to solve blackouts which hurt the economy.

Ivet González, 10-03-2012, reporter for Inter Press Service, international communication institution with a global news agency at its core, raising the voices of the South and civil society on issues of development, globalisation, human rights and the environment, “Cuba’s Fragile Power Grid Needs Renewable Energy,” <http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/10/cubas-fragile-power-grid-needs-renewable-energy/>

Only 3.8 percent of the electric power generated in 2011 in Cuba came from renewable sources, compared to 18 percent in 1979 – a retreat that alarms experts, who fear for the system’s sustainability. “Insufficient availability of electricity could slow down the country’s development,” researcher Conrado Moreno told IPS. “There is no question that the use of renewable energy sources is highly viable,” but investment and changes to Cubans’ everyday living habits are needed, he said. The high international prices of fossil fuels mean that the use of “renewable energy sources has reached cost levels that make them competitive,” Moreno said. These sources are “unlimited, natural and freely accessible,” and they contribute to sustainable development and energy sovereignty, he added. The fragility of Cuba’s national electric power system, which stems from its almost exclusive use of a single source, hydrocarbons, set off alarms in early September, when a breakdown in a high-tension line caused outages in eight provinces. Cuba has about 2,000 MW of wind power potential. Credit: Jorge Luis Baños/IPS From the evening of Sept. 9 to the following morning, a break in transmission was reported for a 220,000-volt line that runs between the central provinces of Ciego de Avila and Villa Clara, according to a press release from the National Electrical Union (UNE) that was reported by the local media. For a little over six hours, partial blackouts occurred in the provinces of Camagüey, Ciego de Ávila and Sancti Spíritus, while a total power outage occurred from Villa Clara to Pinar del Rio, leaving almost the entire western part of the island in the dark. The cause of the breakdown has not been reported. “I saw almost all of Havana without power,” said Olga Palacios, a pensioner who lives in the Cerro municipality in the capital, who said the outage occurred as she was driving back from a visit to her daughter in the Miramar district. In the capital “things have been stable; there were no major blackouts over the summer,” she told IPS. Cubans have not forgotten the lengthy blackouts of the early 1990s, at the start of the economic crisis triggered when Cuba lost its main trading partner and oil supplier, the former Soviet Union. “We would go for more than 24 hours without electricity, and when it came back on, it would only last a little while,” Palacios recounted. Ana San Juan, who lives in Mayabeque province, which borders the capital, told IPS that any problem with the electricity supply worries her. “We prepare our food with electrical appliances,” she pointed out. About 69 percent of Cuban families cook with electricity, which has caused demand for energy to skyrocket. Moreno proposed three ways for the country to increase power generation: “increasing electricity production from fossil fuels, improving energy efficiency, and bolstering the use of renewable sources.” “An appropriate combination of these three elements is the key to success, because none of them can meet the objective on its own,” he said. Related IPS Articles Cuba on the Road to Clean Energy Development CLIMATE CHANGE-CUBA: “Energy is an Instrument of Power” CUBA: Oil Drilling Opens Up New Possibilities CUBA: Sugarcane – Source of Renewable Energy, But Not Ethanol While the use of oil derivatives is still essential, steps should be taken toward reducing their use and eliminating the Cuban economy’s heavy dependency on these fuels, Moreno said. “There is no other way,” he added, recommending an increase in the use of solar, wind and hydraulic energy, among others.

#### The plan is key to diversify Cuban energy sources and ensure self-sustainability – spurs growth and builds economic independence.

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, 9-3-2010, Professor at UNO, Past Director, Intelligence Community Scholars Program at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Senior Research Associate at University of Georgia, freelancer at Santa Barbara Independent, Education @ The University of Georgia, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Fisher Graduate School of International Business, “Evaluating the Prospects for U.S.-Cuban Energy Policy Cooperation,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/press/books/2010/cubasenergyfuture/cubasenergyfuture\_chapter.pdf

Because of recent developments in Cuba and the growing investments being made there made by regional partners, in particular Venezuela and Brazil, the importance of Cuba’s energy development objectives becomes decidedly more pronounced, in terms of both Cuba’s national development priorities and the United States’ energy and geostrategic priorities.9 One of the recommendations made in Rethinking U.S.-Latin American Relations is especially relevant: developing sustainable energy resources. The report recommends that the United States, in partnership with other governments in the hemisphere, establish a “Renewable Energy Laboratory of the Americas” that would promote hemispheric cooperation on developing solar, wind, and cellulosic-biomass technologies; intensify hemispheric cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and promote regulatory regimes that are open to private energy investment and trade in energy technology and services.10 In a special section on U.S.-Cuban relations, Rethinking U.S.-Latin American Relations makes two other recommendations: “Promote knowledge and reconciliation by permitting the federal funding of cultural, academic, and sports exchanges; and encourage enhanced official contact and cooperation between U.S. and Cuban diplomats and governments.”11 The authors go on to articulate a set of steps or best practices that would serve to foster such a partnership and, more important, provide a set of measures open and flexible enough to account for the complexity and specificity of issues that surround energy development. In closing with a special section on Cuba, the report puts the spotlight on the centrality of the island nation and the effective management and potential leadership that it may offer in the effort to deal with these issues. While expanding the ambit of U.S. geostrategic interests in the region, it is critical that the discussion include the role Cuban energy development will have on the assessment and pursuit of those interests. Cuba faces daunting policy challenges in the twenty-first century. Chief among them is the task of providing reliable sources of energy for economic development and revitalization in the post–cold war milieu. In light of the discovery of offshore oil and gas reserves, what policy trajectories and alternatives will increase the probability of energy self-sufficiency and sustainability in Cuba in the short and long term? Perhaps at the time when Cuba diversifies its energy suppliers and develops its offshore resources it will have the economic independence necessary for political and economic evolution. As with many policy issues, Cuban energy policy may or may not conform to objectives that will lead to the successful implementation of the country’s energy development objectives. The Cuban energy problem—that it is highly dependent on energy resources for its economic livelihood—is grounded in well-informed assessments, captured by the technical analyses of production capabilities, transmission and distribution challenges, and growing energy demands. This highly focused body of literature has identified significant shortcomings—high levels of dependency on imported oil, a crumbling energy production capability, and a fragile energy infrastructure—in the analysis of energy policy development and sustainability and in part acknowledges competing approaches toward the resolution of energy problems on the island.12 But these analyses remain acutely attentive to the following elements of the Cuban reality: Cuba has learned from past experiences and is very much aware of political and economic risks related to imported oil. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 2003 oil strike in Venezuela taught Cuba two very expensive lessons. President Raúl Castro understands the risks associated with single-source oil dependency; his visits in 2009 to Brazil, Russia, and Angola underscore his concerns. An emerging energy relationship with Brazil would provide a balance to Cuba’s current dependency; other energy relationships could bring with them the possibility of corrupt and unsavory business practices.

#### Diversification through renewable energy is key to the Cuban economy – energy independence leads to political reforms that create stability – US engagement is key.

Jorge R. Piñón, 5-24-2011, a visiting research fellow at the Latin American and Caribbean Center’s Cuban Research Institute at FIU, “Why the United States and Cuba Collaborate (and What Could Happen If They Don’t),” http://casgroup.fiu.edu/pages/docs/2157/1306356964\_Hemisphere\_Vol.\_20.pdf

Only when Cuba diversifies suppliers and develops its offshore hydrocarbon resources, estimated by the United States Geological Survey at 5.5 million barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, will it have the economic independence to consider political and economic reforms. It is in the US interest to develop a new policy toward the island based on constructive engagement to support the emergence of a Cuban state in which Cubans themselves can determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. Cuba is about to embark on an 18-month oil exploration drilling program to validate the presence of recoverable hydrocarbon reserves. US support of such endeavors would be beneficial in the framework of a constructive engagement policy. The Deepwater Horizon drilling semi-submersible incident and the resulting catastrophic oil spill demonstrate the urgency of developing a policy of energy and environmental cooperation between the United States and Cuba. As Cuba develops its deepwater oil and natural gas potential, the possible consequences of a spill call for proactive planning by both countries to minimize or avoid an environmental disaster. To respond effectively to an oil-related marine accident, any company operating in Cuba would require immediate access to US oil services companies for the nearinstant technology and know-how needed to halt and limit damage to the marine environment. Obviously, the establishment of working relations between the US and Cuba in the area of marine environmental protection would assist enormously in the contingency planning and cooperation necessary for an early and effective response to an oil spill. The United States and Cuba are already parties to a number of multilateral oil pollution agreements, such as the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the 1983 Convention for the protection and Development of the Marine Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention). Both agreements address prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. The 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation also offers a precedent for cooperation. The convention is designed to encourage and facilitate international cooperation and mutual assistance in preparing for and responding to major oil pollution incidents. Signatory nations are tasked with developing and maintaining adequate capabilities to deal with such an emergency. In the case of Cuba and the United States, the capabilities must be transnational, as there is no barrier to the movement of oil from one country’s waters to another’s. The United States, therefore, must develop appropriate regulatory and procedural frameworks for the free movement of equipment, personnel and expertise between the two countries as part of any oil spill response. The 1980 Agreement of Cooperation between the United States and Mexico Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances (MEXUS Plan) provides the foundation for a similar protocol with Cuba. This would include the establishment of joint response teams, coordinating roles, rapid incident notification mechanisms, joint operations centers and communication procedures, along with regular exercises and meetings. The United States government, irrespective of the current embargo, has the power to license the sale, lease or loan of emergency relief and reconstruction equipment and the travel of expert personnel to Cuba following an oil spill. Cuba’s long-term energy challenges will be a consequence of its future economic growth and rising standard of living within a market environment. This anticipated growth will depend largely on the development of a competitively priced, readily available and environmentally sound long-term energy plan. Cuban energy policy should embrace energy conservation, modernization of the energy infrastructure, and balance in sourcing oil/gas supplies and renewable energy sources that protect the island’s environment. The country would benefit from the guidance of a variety of partners, including the United States.

#### Cuban growth is on the brink – oil dependence causes economic collapse which ensures state failure and regional instability.

Dr. Timothy Ashby, 3-29-2013, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “PRESERVING STABILITY IN CUBA AFTER NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES – THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADING WITH STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES,” <http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/>

The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy makers. Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet external and internal factors may accelerate or retard the process. The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is likely to undermine the already dysfunctional Cuban economy, if it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid. This could bring social chaos, especially among the island’s disaffected youth. Such an outcome would generate adverse consequences for U.S. national and regional security. To maintain Cuba’s social and economic stability while reforms are maturing, the United States must throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade with all Cuban enterprises, both private and state-owned. The collapse of Cuba’s tottering economy could seismically impact the United States and neighboring countries. It certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated by a downturn in the Cuban economy which led to tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees landed in the Miami area, including 31,000 criminals and mental patients. Today, the United States defines its national security interests regarding Cuba as follows: • Avoid one or more mass migrations; • Prevent Cuba from becoming another porous border that allows continuous large-scale migration to the hemisphere; • Prevent Cuba from becoming a major source or transshipment point for the illegal drug trade; • Avoid Cuba becoming a state with ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists and others wishing to harm the United States. [2] All of these national security threats are directly related to economic and social conditions within Cuba.

#### That spills over and destabilizes the Caribbean – creates safe havens for terrorists and causes democratic backsliding throughout the region.

Gorrell, 2005 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074>)

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis. Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably. In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems. U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations.

#### Caribbean stability is key to solve bioterror and LNG attacks.

Anthony T. Bryan1 and Stephen E. Flynn2, 10-21-2001, director of the Caribbean program @ the North/South Center1, senior fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations2, “Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/4844/terrorism\_porous\_borders\_and \_homeland\_ security.html

Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception. Already the linkages between drug trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar potential in the Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital. Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that produce the majority of the world’s methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), are vulnerable targets. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United States. An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port. Moreover, terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countries have suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again, Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders.

#### LNG facilities will be targeted – current security measures solve but growing corruption makes breaches more likely.

Mark Tempest, 7-06-2007, retired attorney, retired Navy Reserve Captain (Surface Warfare), writer of the blog EagleSpeak, “Caribbean basin terrorism concerns?” http://www.eaglespeak.us/2007/07/caribbean-basin-terrorism-concerns.html

A new report by the investigative arm of Congress describes the "growing influence" of Islamic radical groups as a threat to the Caribbean's maritime security along with more traditional concerns such as organized gangs, illegal migration and drug trafficking. "The terrorism threat is low in comparison with what's happening every day" in the rest of the world, Stephen Caldwell, the main author of the Government Accountability Office report, said Thursday. "But the Islamic radical threat needs a little more focus down there." \*\*\* The report, based on information from U.S. agencies and Caribbean government officials, warns of a radical Muslim group that launched a bloody coup attempt in 1990 and says militant organizations including Hezbollah have a presence in such countries as Venezuela and Colombia. It said Caribbean ports would be vulnerable to attacks because of corruption, lax security and limited resources to maintain equipment. U.S. State Department officials, it noted, have witnessed open, unattended gates and other security gaps at ports where cruise ships dock. "The threats are not known, but the vulnerabilities are pretty well known and of concern," Caldwell said. Islands vigorously defend their handling of security at ports that are the point of entry for many tourists. "The whole country's economy depends on this so we have prioritized," said Anthony Belmar of Grenada's Port Authority, which recently installed close-circuit television cameras among other security upgrades. "It's not something we're sleeping on." More on the report here: Referred to as our "third border," the Caribbean Basin has significant maritime links with the United States. Given these links and the region's proximity, the United States is particularly interested in ensuring that the ports in the Caribbean Basin--through which goods bound for this country's ports and cruise ships carrying its citizens must travel--are secure. And the report is available in pdf format here. Excerpts: While intelligence sources report that no specific, credible terrorist threats to maritime security exist in the Caribbean Basin, the officials we spoke to indicated that there are a number of security concerns that could affect port security in the region. Caribbean ports contain a variety of facilities such as cargo facilities, cruise ship terminals, and facilities that handle petroleum products and liquefied natural gas. Additionally, several Caribbean ports are among the top cruise ship destinations in the world. Given the volume and value of this maritime trade, the facilities and infrastructure of the maritime transportation system may be attractive targets for a terrorist attack. Our prior work on maritime security issues has revealed that the three most likely modes of attack in the port environment are a suicide attack using an explosive-laden vehicle or vessel, a standoff attack using small arms or rockets, and the traditional armed assault. Beyond the types of facilities and modes of attack to be considered, officials we spoke to identified a number of overarching security concerns that relate to the Caribbean Basin asx a whole. Among these concerns are (1) the level of corruption that exists in some Caribbean nations to undermine the rule of law in these countries, (2) organized gang activity occurring in proximity to or within port facilities, and (3) the geographic proximity of many Caribbean countries, which has made them transit countries for cocaine and heroin destined for U.S. markets. Other security concerns in the Caribbean Basin mentioned by U.S. agency officials include stowaways, illegal migration, and the growing influence of Islamic radical groups and other foreign terrorist organizations.

#### LNG explosions outweigh nuclear war.

Tom Bender, 1-15-2005, architect, author, economist, one of the founders of the “green architecture” and “sustainability” movements, his “Factor 10” economic principles have been endorsed by the European Union, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and the United Nations Environmental Program, cites a research study from the Sandia National Laboratories, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center and a part of the DOE, “LNG Imports: Neither Safe nor Wise,” http://www.tombender.org/societyworthlivingforarticles/lng.pdf

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is considered by transportation officials to be a "hazardous and noxious substance". The Port of Astoria, and the community has been told by Calpine representatives that their proposed Skipanon LNG import terminal would be safe, and that any LNG spills would just fizz and evaporate "like 7-UP". But a just-released Sandia research lab study (SAND2004-6258) joins the voices of long-term government funded researchers to strongly disagree. Although the operational safety of the LNG industry has been good overall, the hazards of our post 9/11 world are not operational safety but intentional acts of destruction. And LNG terminals and tankers are prime terrorist targets. LNG tankers are huge – as long as the World Trade Center buildings were tall – and contain 35,000,000 gallons or more of LNG. That represents the energy equivalent of 60 to 80 Hiroshima bombs. Not one, but sixty to eighty Hiroshima bombs! An accident affecting even a tiny part of that energy can be catastrophic. LNG is less likely to be as "explosive" as a nuclear weapon, but the far greater amount of energy, and drifting fireballs of burning gas could be even more destructive than Hiroshima. "Terrorist attacks on tankers carrying liquefied natural gas into a U.S. port could trigger a fire that could burn the skin of people a mile away and cause major injuries and significant structural damage within about a third of a mile," says the Washington Post (Dec 22, '04). The Sandia report, prepared by that Energy Department laboratory, stated that, "terrorists could use rocket-propelled grenades, missiles, planes or boats to break open the tankers." The Post also quotes James A. Fay, a professor emeritus of mechanical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who has studied LNG safety for 35 years, "If there were a successful attack, then the consequences can be very severe. I think this report has done a lot to get the science of this consequence analysis out on the table where everyone can see it." An LNG spill can create major hazards that extend over considerable area. It can cause asphyxiation, cryogenic burns, structural damage and failure, 3000oF fireballs several thousand feet across and hundreds of feet high, fuel-air (vapor cloud) detonations or explosions that can cover very large distances, and rapid phase transitions (explosive boiling of the cold liquid). There remains considerable uncertainty about extent of potential hazard depending on rate of LNG release, possible ignition sources, wind direction and speed, etc. But the fine print isn't important with fire hazards of that scale. And with abutting property owner, Weyerhaeuser, having filed for a permit to expand the size of their open-flame boilers, is Warrenton a good location for an LNG terminal? A burning vapor cloud from an LNG tanker at the Skipinon site could extend beyond Astoria. Even this new report may significantly underestimate potential damage. It assumes that only three of the five or more holds of a tanker might be affected, and that the hole through which LNG would be released would not be larger than 5 meters2 – although a hole twenty times as large (100 meter2) had already been blown by terrorists in the double-hulled Limberg oil tanker, (below). And the amounts of LNG involved are 100 to 1000 times as large as any real tests which have ever been performed. The firestorms from bombing Dresden and Tokyo in WWII were not predicted from the effects of dropping a few single bombs. This 30' (100 meter2) hole blasted by terrorists through the double hull of the French oil tanker Limburg indicates that LNG can be spilled far more rapidly than by the 5 meter2 opening used in government safety studies. The Sandia report also largely ignores airborne attacks on tankers (where tanks are unprotected by the ship's double hull), and the potential use of fuel-air bombs to disperse the LNG more explosively into the air. The tops of LNG tanker holds are far more vulnerable to terrorist actions than the lower parts, which are protected by double hulls and greater amounts of insulation. Fuel-air bombs are shockwave bombs that could cause dispersal and detonation of a tanker of LNG like atomic bombs are used to detonate larger hydrogen bombs. (A GOOGLE on "fuel-air bombs" will give you immediately two New Scientist articles – "First Test for US Monster Bomb" saying it "creates a mushroom cloud and a shockwave similar to that of a small nuclear explosion" and a second, "Experts Fear Terrorists Are Seeking Fuel-Air Bombs" telling where terrorists can obtain either large or shoulder rocket launched versions. Reading these reports do not dispel fears of LNG terminal hazards. The "superbomb" fuel-air explosives get their destructive power by dispersing their "fuel" into the air before detonation. Use of their shock blast to disperse LNG tanker cargo into the air before detonation has the potential for the same action on vastly larger scale.

#### Bioterror is the biggest existential risk.

Matheny 07 – Research associate with the [Future of Humanity Institute](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_of_Humanity_Institute) @ [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University) [Jason G. Matheny (PhD candidate in Applied Economics and Master’s in Public Health at [Johns Hopkins University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johns_Hopkins_University)), “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction,” [\_\_Risk Analysis.\_\_](http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2007.00960.x) Volume 27, Number 5, 2007, pg.<http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2007_orig-articles/2007-10-15-reducingrisk.html>]

Of current extinction risks, the most severe may be bioterrorism. The knowledge needed to engineer a virus is modest compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the necessary equipment andmaterials are increasingly accessible and because biological agents are self-replicating, a weapon can have an exponential effect on a population (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006).5 Current U.S. biodefense efforts are funded at $5 billion per year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor biological agents and emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of local health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, & Shuler, 2006).

#### Cuban alt energy spills over to Venezuela.

Laurie Guevara-Stone, 4-09-2009, International Program manager at Solar Energy International, based in Colorado, “La Revolucion Energetica: Cuba's Energy Revolution,” http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/04/la-revolucion-energetica-cubas-energy-revolution

Cuba is also making progress on liquid biofuels such as ethanol. Usually involving the use of food crops like corn, the official stance on biofuels is that ‘Cuba does not support the idea of converting food into fuels, while more than 800 million people suffer hunger.’ Nevertheless, there are some liquid biofuel pilot projects. The best example is the cultivation of Jatropha Carcus which produces a non-edible oil, and which thus does not compete with human food production. In 2007 a National Group aimed at supporting and promoting the accelerated development and penetration of renewable sources of energy and energy efficiency was created. The 14 commissions of this group, covering all types of renewable sources of energy and efficiency, have a government mandate to study better ways to introduce renewable energies into the country. The island has exported its Energy Revolution to other countries as well, in the framework of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). ALBA emphasizes the fight against poverty and social exclusion. For instance, after Cuba worked with Venezuela on an energy conservation campaign, Venezuela reported savings of 2000 MW of power. Cuban scientists and technicians have also provided and installed over 1 MW of solar electric panels in Venezuela, Bolivia, Honduras, South Africa, Mali and Lesotho. ‘We need a global energy revolution,’ says Mario Alberto Arrastia Avila, an energy expert with Cubaenergia, an energy information centre in Cuba. ‘But in order for this to happen we also need a revolution in consciousness. Cuba has undertaken its own path towards a new energy paradigm, applying concepts like distributed generation, efficiency, education, energy solidarity, and the gradual solarization of the country.’

#### Direct engagement can’t solve – failure to engage with Cuba terminally dooms US-Venezuela cooperation.

Jesse Jackson, 3-11-2013, Founder and President of the Rainbow/PUSH Coalition, one of America's foremost civil rights, religious and political figures, founded Operation PUSH and the National Rainbow Coalition, a national social justice organization, author of several books, “Time to restart U.S.-Venezuela relations,” http://www.suntimes.com/news/jackson/18781426-452/time-to-restart-us-venezuela-relations.html

Venezuela has surpassed Saudi Arabia for the country with the largest oil reserves in the world, and the U.S. is the largest importer of Venezuelan oil. Its oil is four days away, as opposed to four weeks away from the Middle East. Chavez provoked the anger of the Bush administration, but he was a hero to the poor in his country, and to peoples in developing nations across the world. Chavez objected to U.S. policy in the region, leading eventually to a break in relations in 2008 amid accusations of the U.S. aiding anti-government groups in Bolivia. Relations were re-established in 2009 by the Obama administration. Chavez was particularly close to Fidel Castro and the leadership in Cuba, openly scorning America’s five-decade-old embargo and relentless efforts to isolate Cuba. Now, as America winds down its longest wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, perhaps there will be more opportunity to focus on our neighbors in this hemisphere. What is apparent is that the old policies — focused on the Cuban embargo that dates from the height of the Cold War and a “Washington consensus” on conservative economics that much of the hemisphere has turned against — aren’t working. We are isolating ourselves, not the Cubans or the Venezuelans. At the Organization of American States meeting in 2012, only two nations — the U.S. and Canada — voted for continuing to exclude Cuba. The remaining 30 nations put the U.S. on notice that Cuba will be invited to the next meetings. The Chavez-backed Community of Latin America and Caribbean States, which excludes only the U.S. and Canada, could well rival OAS in the future. In a pointed statement, it recently elected Cuba’s Raul Castro as its head for the year. At Chavez’s funeral, leaders of the new populist politics in Latin America gathered — including the presidents of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. Some have used anti-American postures to consolidate their legitimacy at home. All search for building greater economic and political independence from the U.S. A year ago, at the April Summit of the Americas, President Obama listened patiently to many provocative comments and called for a new start. “I am not somebody who brings to the table here a lot of baggage from the past,” he said, “and I want to look at all these problems in a new and fresh way.” Surely it is time now to move on that promise. America should engage its neighbors, not isolate itself trying to isolate them. We should end our failed embargo of Cuba. We do far better trying to talk through our disagreements than trying to punish our neighbors. Across the hemisphere, peoples are struggling to find a way to make economies work for working people. This nation is no exception. We would be wise to join in that search, rather than to split apart.

#### Venezuela’s losing oil power now – resurgent US production, destroyed refineries and new tech.

Laurent Belsie, 3-07-2013, Economics Editor at The Christian Science Monitor, BSJ in Journalism @ Northwestern University, “What will Venezuela do with its oil? Top five energy challenges after Chàvez.” http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2013/0307/What-will-Venezuela-do-with-its-oil-Top-five-energy-challenges-after-Chavez/Relationship-with-the-US

Chávez made no secret of his disdain for the United States, especially after a 2002 coup that briefly knocked him out of power – the US did not condemn it until it was clear that the takeover had failed. But for all the public tension, Venezuela has remained an important supplier of crude oil to the US. True, it supplied 44 percent less oil to the States last year than in 1998, the year before Chavez came to power. But it remains a top tier supplier. And the decline has much to do with increasing domestic oil production, which has reduced the need for Venezuelan oil. Still, the balance of power in the energy sector has changed.

 When Chávez came to power, Venezuela was a pivotal player in OPEC and the US was dependent on its oil as its own production continued to decline. Now, US production is resurgent, thanks to hydraulic fracturing technology. Venezuela's falling production has weakened its clout and its leverage. Its refineries are tottering from years of neglect, forcing Venezuela to import gasoline from the US to satisfy demand. Last year, a fire at the nation's largest refinery resulted in 42 fatalities.

#### Oil dependence collapses the Venezuelan economy.

Benedict Mander, 7-15-2012, [Qualifications needed], Financial Times, “Venezuela more prone to oil price jitters,” www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/415985c2-7a88-11e1-8ae6-00144feab49a.html#axzz24lgnWrjK

With fewer than 100 days to go until the October 7 presidential election, the issue of Venezuela’s growing “oil dependency” and the government’s record of economic mismanagement has come to the fore as recent polls show Mr Chávez in a statistical tie with opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski. “There is no question about it. Venezuela is not only more dependent on oil, but it is more dependent on the price of oil, as production has not increased,” says Jorge Piñon, a research fellow at the University of Texas. The rise in oil prices since Mr Chávez came to power in 1998 has been a boon in many ways, allowing him to bolster his popularity by splurging oil revenues on social programmes, in to which state-owned oil company PDVSA funnelled some $53bn between 2006 and 2010. The problem, however, is that PDVSA has neglected to invest in its core business, causing production to decline: it spent just $1bn in exploration activities over the same period. Venezuela produced 2.72m barrels a day in 2011, according to BP’s annual statistical review, versus 3.48m bpd in 1998 when Mr Chávez was first elected. This has made the economy more dependent on oil prices staying high. “Oil prices are the Achilles heel of the Venezuelan economy,” added Mr Piñon. Venezuelan oil prices fell to a low of $86.17 a bazrrel last month, after peaking at $116.85 a barrel in March. Despite Mr Chávez’s wishful prediction recently that oil prices should stabilise at around $100, fears that prices will continue to slide have triggered concerns about Venezuela’s $340bn economy, which relies on oil for 95 per cent of export earnings.

#### Venezuelan state failure causes a litany of impacts.

Max G. Manwaring, 10-xx-2005, holds the General Douglas MacArthur Chair and is Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. He is a retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College. He has served in various civilian and military positions, including the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Southern Command, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Dr. Manwaring is the author and co-author of several articles, chapters, and reports dealing with political-military affairs, democratization and global ungovernability, and Latin American security affairs. He is also the editor or co-editor of El Salvador at War; Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations; Deterrence in the 21st Century; and The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century. Dr. Manwaring holds a B.S. in Economics, a B.S. in Political Science, an M.A. in Political Science, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. “Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf

Chávez understands all this. He understands that war is no longer limited to using military violence to bring about desired political change. Rather, all means that can be brought to bear on a given situation must be used to compel a targeted government to do one’s will. This caudillo will tailor his campaign to his adversaries’ political and economic vulnerabilities, and to their psychological precepts. And this is the basis of Chávez’s instruction to the Venezuelan armed forces (at the “1st Military Forum on Fourth Generation War and Asymmetric War” in 2004) to develop a doctrinal paradigm change from conventional to people’s war.61 The Issue of State Failure. President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.

62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring 23 about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65

# 2AC

## Hemispheric Energy

### AT: Higher Production

#### Higher production levels won’t solve – Saudi proves

Reuters 12 (News Organization, “World oil supply tightens in last 2 months: EIA,” <http://dawn.com/2012/08/25/world-oil-supply-tightens-in-last-2-months-eia/> ;)

The EIA said on Friday global spare production capacity was “relatively tight by historical standards” at 2.4 million bpd, steady with the last report. Global inventories fell even as Saudi Arabia produced oil in July and August at a rate that was 900,000 bpd higher than its average rate over the last three years, the EIA said. The OPEC powerhouse is producing at higher rates as output in its rival Iran gets hit by sanctions on both sides of the Atlantic.

## T

### AT: “Economic engagement is QPQ”

#### Economic engagement is distinct from a quid pro quo

Arda Can Çelik, 7-08-2011, political strategy analyst, M.A. political science and IR @ Uppasala University, Sweden, “Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies,” <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies>

Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties. (Garzke et al,2001). Economic engagement operates with trade mechanisms where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly different from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the target countries’ Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential. (Kroll,1993)

#### **Aff ground – QPQ’s fail**

Pascual et al 9 [Carlos Pascual, VP and Director of Foreign Policy @ Brookings; Vicki Huddleston, Visiting Fellow @ Brookings; Gustavo Arnavat, Attorney at law; Ann Louise Bardach, Author/Journalist at UC Santa Barbara; Dr. Ramon Colás, Co-Director, Center for the Understanding of Cubans of African Descent; Dr. Jorge I. Domínguez, Vice-provost for international Affairs and professor of Mexican and Latin American politics and Economics @ Harvard; Daniel Erikson, Senior Associate for U.S. policy and Director of Caribbean programs at Inter-American Dialogue; Dr. Mark Falcoff, resident Scholar Emeritus @ AEI; Dr. Damián J. Fernández, Provost and Executive VP at Purchase College; Dr. Andy S. Gomez, Nonresident Senior Fellow at Brookings, Assistant provost at the University of Miami and Senior Fellow at the institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies; Jesús Gracia, Former Spanish Ambassador to Cuba; Paul Hare, Former British Ambassador to Cuba; Francisco J. (Pepe) Hernández, president, Cuban American National Foundation; Dr. William LeoGrande, Dean, School of public Affairs, American University; Dr. Marifeli pérez-stable, Vice president for Democratic Governance, Inter-American Dialogue; Jorge r. piñón, Energy Fellow, Center for Hemispheric policy, University of Miami; dr. Archibald ritter, Distinguished research professor Emeritus, Department of Economics and Norman paterson School of international Affairs, Carleton University; Andrés rozental, Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings institution, Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico; Carlos saladrigas, Co-Chairman, Cuba Study Group, “CUBA:A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement,” April 2009, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ipor/cuba-t/BrookingsCubaReport-English.pdf]

Medium-Term Initiatives¶ The second basket of initiatives is distinct from the first because it moves beyond enhancing the ability of Cubans to take a more proactive and informed part in their society and government. The initiatives in the second basket seek to build a foundation for reconciliation by beginning a process of resolving long-standing differences. A number of these initiatives could serve as incentives or rewards for improved human rights, the release of political prisoners, and greater freedom of assembly, speech and rights for opposition groups and labor unions. initiatives that fall within this category include allowing Cuba access to normal commercial instruments for the purchase of goods from the United States. ¶ None of the initiatives, however, should be publicly or privately tied to specific Cuban actions. As the Cuban government is on record as rejecting any type of carrot-and-stick tactic, it would be counterproductive to do so. Rather, the United States should decide the actions that it wishes to take and when to carry them out. Doing so will give the president maximum flexibility in determining how and when to engage.

## Security K

### 2AC Framework

#### **Framework – we should weigh the aff against the alternative – constant changes in the political sphere means only plan focused debate can allow for active engagement with Latin America**

Thomas E. Keller et al, James K. Whittaker and Tracey K. Burke, Spring/Summer 2001 (Thomas E. Keller is assistant professor, School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago, James K. Whittaker is professor, and Tracey K. Burke is a doctoral student, School of Social Work, University of Washington, Council on Social Work Education, “Student Debates in Policy Courses: Promoting Policy Practice Skills and Knowledge through Active Learning,” jstor >:)

The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruc tion of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue. Debates and Active Learning Dewey theorized that learning and re flective thinking are based on active engagement with a specific problem or issue (Baker, 1955; Dewey, 1939). This prin ciple underlies contemporary and widely held notions that students learn more effectively by actively analyzing, discuss ing, and applying content in meaningful ways rather than passively absorbing in formation through a lecture (Bean, 1996; Bonwell & Eison, 1991; Lewis & Williams, 1994; Meyers & Jones, 1993). Experien tial education immerses students in an experience so that they may learn by doing. Experiential learning, in the form of the practicum placement, is a key ele ment in social work education. However, few social work students enroll in politi cal or policy oriented practica. In a sur vey of 161 CSWE-accredited programs (131 BSW, 30 MSW), Wolk and colleagues (1996) found that less than half offered practice in government relations (BSW=20%, MSW=47%) and even fewer had placements in policy advocacy/de velopment (BSW=15%, MSW=33%). Moreover, programs typically reported only one or two students participating in these types of placements, with the larg est representation at a single school be ing 9 out of 250 MSW students (Wolk et al., 1996). Because few students receive policy-related field education, introducing students to policy relevant skills and experiences via active learning exercises in the classroom assumes greater importance. Bonwell and Eison (1991) describe the general characteristics of active learn ing in the classroom: • Students are involved in more than listening. • Less emphasis is placed on transmitting information and more on developing students' skills. • Students are involved in higher-order think ing (analysis, synthesis, evaluation). • Students are engaged in activities. • Greater emphasis is placed on students' exploration of their own attitudes and val ues. (p. 2) Experiential learning in the classroom may involve case studies, role plays, debates, simulations, or other activities that allow students to make connections among theory, knowledge, and experience (Lewis & Williams, 1994). These active learning strategies encourage stu dents to think on their feet, to question their own values and responses to situa tions, and to consider new ways of think ing in contexts which they may experience more intensely and, consequently, may remember longer (Meyers&Jones, 1993). Educational Effectiveness of Debates Since its origins in classical times, aca demic debate has been recognized as one of the best methods of learning and applying the attributes of critical think ing (Freeley, 1996). Recent empirical studies of students participating in com petitive interschool forensics societies illustrate the link between debating and proficiency in critical thinking. Colbert (1987) found that students involved in intercollegiate debating for one year showed a larger pretest to posttest gain on a critical thinking test than a nondebating control group. Likewise, Shinn (1995) discovered that, after sta tistically controlling for intelligence, high school students who engaged in two years of competitive debating exhibited higher levels of critical thinking than a compari son group of nondebaters. Debates have been recommended as a strategy to engage students in active learn ing in the classroom (Bean, 1996; Bonwell &Eison, 1991; Schroeder&Ebert, 1983). The use of in-class debates has been re ported in subjects as diverse as sociology and dentistry (Huryn, 1986; Scannapieco, 1997). Nevertheless, a search of the lit erature revealed no reference to student debates within social work education, despite evidence that debates have been assigned in some social work courses (Zlotnik, Rome,& DePanfilis, 1998). Fur thermore, the authors discovered only two studies, both by Combs and Bourne (1989, 1994), which provide empirical evidence of the value of debates in a classroom context. In their initial report, Combs and Bourne (1989) presented findings on the use of debates in two upper level business courses with a com bined enrollment of 59 students. Nearly 80% of the students (n=47) believed the debates provided them with a better un derstanding of both sides of the issues than a standard lecture format would have. Likewise, 66% (n=39) felt they had learned more than if the course material had been presented in a lecture. Another important finding was that students' con fidence in their public speaking skills increased following the debates. In gen eral, there was satisfaction with the de bates. At the beginning of the course only 57% of the students (n=35) looked forward to the upcoming debates, but by the end of the course 85% (n=50) stated that they enjoyed the debates, and 71% (n=42) wished debates were used in other courses. Combs and Bourne (1994) ex tended their initial study to cover a five year period with a combined sample of over 500 students. The results were even stronger in favor of using debates, per haps reflecting improvement in the in structors' application of the debate format over time.

### Framework – Bryant

#### The alternative provides pure critique that does nothing – proposing specific policies is good and necessary

Bryant 12—professor of philosophy at Collin College (Levi, McKenzie Wark: How Do You Occupy an Abstraction?, larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/mckenzie-wark-how-do-you-occupy-an-abstraction/#more-6320 WE DON’T ENDORSE GENDERED LANGUAGE WE THINK ITS BAD)

In the language of my machine-oriented ontology or onticology, we would say that we only ever encounter local manifestations of hyperobjects, local events or appearances of hyperobjects, and never the hyperobject as such. Hyperobjects as such are purely virtual or withdrawn. They can’t be directly touched. And what’s worse, contrary to Locke’s principle of individuation whereby an individual is individuated by virtue of its location in a particular place and at a particular time, hyperobjects are without a site or place. They are, as Morton says, non-local. This, then, is a central problem, for how do you combat something that is everywhere and nowhere? How do you engage something that is non-local? If an army is over there I can readily target it. If a particular munitions factor is over here, then I can readily target it. But how do we target something that is non-local and that is incorporeal? This is the problem with occupying an abstraction. Second, contemporary capitalism is massively redundant. This, I think, is what Wark is getting at when he speaks of contemporary power as “vectoral”. Under what Wark calls “vector power”, we have configurations of power where attacks at one site have very little impact insofar as flows can simply be re-channeled through another set of nodes in the network. Like a hydra, you cut off one head only to have another head appear in its place. The head can never be cut off once and for all because there is no single head. The crisis of contemporary politics is thus the crisis of the erasure of site. In the age of hyperobjects, we come to dwell in a world where there is no clear site of political antagonism and therefore no real sense of how and where to engage. Here I’m also inclined to say that we need to be clear about system references in our political theorizing and action. We think a lot about the content of our political theorizing and positions, but I don’t think we think a lot about how our political theories are supposed to actually act in the world. As a result, much contemporary leftist political theory ends up in a performative contradiction. It claims, following Marx, that it’s aim is not to represent the world but to change it, yet it never escapes the burrows of academic journals, conferences, and presses to actually do so. Like the Rat-Man’s obsessional neurosis where his actions in returning the glasses were actually designed to fail, there seems to be a built in tendency in these forms of theorization to unconsciously organize their own failure. And here I can’t resist suggesting that this comes as no surprise given that, in Lacanian terms, the left is the position of the hysteric and as such has “a desire for an unsatisfied desire”. In such circumstances the worst thing consists in getting what you want. We on the left need to traverse our fantasy so as to avoid thissterile and self-defeating repetition; and this entails shifting from the position of political critique (hysterical protest), to political construction– actually envisioning and building alternatives. So what’s the issue with system-reference? The great autopoietic sociological systems theorist, Niklas Luhmann, makes this point nicely. For Luhmann, there are intra-systemic references and inter-systemic references. Intra-systemic references refer to processes that are strictly for the sake of reproducing or maintaining the system in question. Take the example of a cell. A cell, for-itself, is not for anything beyond itself. The processes that take place within the cell are simply for continuing the existence of the cell across time. While the cell might certainly emit various chemicals and hormones as a result of these processes, from its own intra-systemic perspective, it is not for the sake of affecting these other cells with those hormones. They’re simply by-products. Capitalism or economy is similar. Capitalists talk a good game about benefiting the rest of the world through the technologies they produce, the medicines they create (though usually it’s government and universities that invent these medicines), the jobs they create, etc., but really the sole aim of any corporation is identical to that of a cell: to endure through time or reproduce itself through the production of capital. This production of capital is not for anything and does not refer to anything outside itself. These operations of capital production are intra-systemic. By contrast, inter-systemic operations would refer to something outside the system and its auto-reproduction. They would be for something else. Luhmann argues that every autopoietic system has this sort of intra-systemic dimension. Autopoietic systems are, above all, organized around maintaining themselves or enduring. This raises serious questions about academic political theory. Academia is an autopoietic system. As an autopoietic system, it aims to endure, reproduce itself, etc. It must engage in operations or procedures from moment to moment to do so. These operations consist in the production of students that eventually become scholars or professors, the writing of articles, the giving ofconferences, the production of books and classes, etc. All of these are operations through which the academic system maintains itself across time. The horrifying consequence of this is that the reasons we might give for why we do what we do might (and often) have little to do with what’s actually taking place in system continuance. We say that our articles are designed to demolish capital, inequality, sexism, homophobia, climate disaster, etc., but if we look at how this system actually functions we suspect that the references here are only intra-systemic, that they are only addressing the choir or other academics, that they are only about maintaining that system, and that they never proliferate through the broader world. Indeed, our very style is often a big fuck you to the rest of the world as it requires expert knowledge to be comprehended, thereby insuring that it can have no impact on broader collectives to produce change. Seen in this light, it becomes clear that our talk about changing the world is a sort of alibi, a sort of rationalization, for a very different set of operations that are taking place. Just as the capitalist says he’s trying to benefit the world, the academic tries to say he’s trying to change the world when all he’s really doing is maintaining a particular operationally closed autopoietic system. How to break this closure is a key question for any truly engaged political theory. And part of breaking that closure will entail eating some humble pie. Adam Kotsko wrote a wonderful and hilarious post on the absurdities of some political theorizing and its self-importance today. We’ve failed horribly with university politics and defending the humanities, yet in our holier-than-thou attitudes we call for a direct move to communism. Perhaps we need to reflect a bit on ourselves and our strategies and what political theory should be about. Setting all this aside, I think there’s a danger in Wark’s claims about abstraction (though I think he’s asking the right sort of question). The danger in treating hyperobjects like capitalism as being everywhere and nowhere is that our ability to act becomes paralyzed. As a materialist, I’m committed to the thesis that everything is ultimately material and requires some sort of material embodiment. If that’s true, it follows that there are points of purchase on every object, even where that object is a hyperobject. This is why, given the current form that power takes or the age of hyperobjects, I believe that forms of theory such as new materialism, object-oriented ontology, and actor-network theory are more important than ever (clearly the Whiteheadians are out as they see everything as internally related, as an organism, and therefore have no way of theorizing change and political engagement; they’re quasi-Hegelian, justifying even the discord in the world as a part of “god’s” selection and harmonization of intensities). The important thing to remember is that hyperobjects like capitalism are unable to function without a material base. They require highways, shipping routes, trains and railroads, fiber optic cables for communication, and a host of other things besides. Without what Shannon Mattern calls “infrastructure”, it’s impossible for this particular hyperobject exists. Every hyperobject requires its arteries. Information, markets, trade, require the paths along which they travel and capitalism as we know it today would not be possible without its paths. The problem with so much political theory today is that it focuses on the semiosphere in the form of ideologies, discourses, narratives, laws, etc., ignoring the arteries required for the semiosphere to exercise its power. For example, we get OWS standing in front of Wall Street protesting– engaging in a speech act –yet one wonders if speech is an adequate way of addressing the sort of system we exist in. Returning to system’s theory, is the system of capital based on individual decisions of bankers and CEO’s, or does the system itself have its own cognition, it’s own mode of action, that they’re ineluctably trapped in? Isn’t there a sort of humanist prejudice embodied in this form of political engagement? It has value in that it might create larger collectives of people to fight these intelligent aliens that live amongst us (markets, corporations, etc), but it doesn’t address these aliens themselves because it doesn’t even acknowledge their existence. What we need is a politics adequate to hyperobjects, and that is above all a politics that targets arteries. OOO, new materialism, and actor-network theory are often criticized for being “apolitical” by people who are fascinated with political declarations, who are obsessed with showing that your papers are in order, that you’ve chosen the right team, and that see critique and protest as the real mode of political engagement. But it is not clear what difference these theorists are making and how they are escaping intra-systemic self-reference and auto-reproduction. But the message of these orientations is “to the things themselves!”, “to the assemblages themselves!” “Quit your macho blather about where you stand, and actually map power and how it exercises itself!” And part of this re-orientation of politics, if it exists, consists in rendering deconstruction far more concrete. Deconstruction would no longer show merely the leaks in any system and its diacritical oppositions, it would go to the things themselves. What does that mean? It means that deconstruction would practice onto-cartography or identify the arteries by which capitalism perpetuates itself and find ways to block them. You want to topple the 1% and get their attention? Don’t stand in front of Wall Street and bitch at bankers and brokers, occupy a highway. Hack a satellite and shut down communications. Block a port. Erase data banks, etc. Block the arteries; block the paths that this hyperobject requires to sustain itself. This is the only way you will tilt the hands of power and create bargaining power with government organs of capital and corporations. You have to hit them where they live, in their arteries. Did anyone ever change their diet without being told that they would die? Your critique is an important and indispensable step, but if you really wish to produce change you need to find ways to create heart attacks and aneurysms. Short of that, your activity is just masturbation. But this requires coming to discern where the arteries are and doing a little less critique of cultural artifacts and ideologies. Yet choose your targets carefully. The problem with the Seattle protests was that they chose idiotic targets and simply acted on impotent rage. A window is not an artery. It doesn’t organize a flow of communication and capital.  It’s the arteries that you need to locate.  I guess this post will get Homeland Security after me.

### Framework – Latin America Education

#### Engaging Latin America policy is key to civic engagement – a constantly shifting Latin America political sphere means that only policy education can solve

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Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are undergoing processes of unprecedented social, economic, and political change that are having an impact on traditional forms of social cohesion. New problems and challenges proliferate. They were brought on by the globalization of processes, production patterns, and material and symbolic exchanges, all of which place complex demands on political institutions, practices, and culture. We are faced with a paradox: The complexity of modern life, now more than ever, demands democratic politics as a space in which to develop common responses to old and new problems. Nevertheless, the demands fail to engage the next generation, which is the best educated in the history of the region.7 We must urgently examine what educational institutions offer today in terms of citizenship education and explore ways to explicitly and consistently encourage their transformation. The combination of the challenges of poverty and governance, more than any others, calls for active citizenship. Trust in others (the foundation of all civic participation) needs to be raised to a higher level. Respect for the law, a necessary condition for all democratic regimes, must be matched by criteria for justice and the knowledge and skills needed to change laws through peaceful and responsible means. The principles of transparency and accountability must steer relations between citizens, their representatives, and government authorities. Citizens must be politically informed and educated and believe they have a say in community issues and government affairs at every level. A citizen democracy needs to be formed in the region that can work through Marshall’s above-cited three dimensions—political, civil, and social citizenship (UNDP 2004). Without these conditions, steady development and integrated societies will not be possible. A democratic culture must be established to strengthen or create in individuals (and in society) an appreciation of the public and political spheres, the ability to interpret information, and to cooperate, participate, and resolve conflicts.

### Perm

#### Perm solves best – we need to combine problem solving with a critical methodology – the alternative alone fails

Alastair Murray, 1997, professor of IR, University of Wales-Swansea, Reconstructing Realism: Between power politics and cosmopolitan ethics, p 177-178

Beyond the issue of the role that realism plays in normative international debates, the issue of the way in which it fits into post-international debates presents itself. International relations theory is currently suspended between the twin poles of a body of orthodox 'rationalist', or 'problem-solving', theory, and a growing body of ‘reflectivist', or 'critical', theory.1 Underlying these are two contending philosophies, a conservatism which privileges the extant to the exclusion of the possible, and a progressivism which privileges the possible to the exclusion of the extant. As Robert Cox, perhaps the first to draw attention to this division, points out, the former: / takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for actions. The general aim of problem-solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble. / Critical theory, by way of contrast, 'is directed toward an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problem solving accepts as its parameters.2 Consequently, each takes a very different path towards theorising international politics. Problem-solving theory adopts a positivist methodology in order to gain the necessary clarity to generate scientific laws of politics. Yet, if the distinction between subject and object which this methodology establishes permits the detailed empirical analysis of specific problems, it also rigidities the social realm into a material objectivity such that the possibility of change is eliminated. Critical theory, on the other hand, adopts an interpretative methodology in order to emphasise the social construction of international politics and, thus, the potential for its reform. Yet, if the interaction of subject and object which this methodology emphasises allows it the flexibility necessary to deal with historical change, it also prevents it from acquiring the clarity necessary for the explanation of international politics such that the possibility of articulating any general laws of politics is eliminated.3 Each thus has strengths and weaknesses. Critical theory can accommodate historical change, whilst problem-solving theory is ahistorical; yet problem-solving theory is capable of a precision that critical theory can never hope to attain.4 Ultimately, Cox concludes, '[tlhe strength of the one is the weakness of the other'. Problem-solving theory is suited to stable periods, but critical theory must take over in periods of historical change.5 / Cox's articulation of the division between the two approaches is perhaps definitive, but his conclusion is much more problematic. Whilst he is undoubtedly correct to argue that each has a contribution to make, this does not suggest, as he presumes, a strategy of alternation according to the stability of the historical process. It is precisely this question of stability which is ultimately at stake in the debates between rationalist and reflectivist perspectives, and the danger is always that the one will predominate to the exclusion of the other in periods ill-suited to it, undermining whatever possibilities of order or reform actually exist. Consequently, a strategy of alternation is inevitably going to prove inadequate to the challenges posed by world politics; what is required is some form of synthesis.6 Realism, I will argue, is capable of providing a foundation on which such a perspective might be built. It is, of course, conventionally treated as a part of the rationalist orthodoxy — and hence criticised for reproducing an iniquitous status quo by seeking to mitigate its problems. Yet, as should already be apparent from the understanding of realism put forward in earlier chapters, this account is clearly problematic. If realism emphasises the need to grasp what semblance of order can be obtained under the current structure of the system, it nevertheless acknowledges the need to investigate the possibilities of reforming this structure. If it makes use of aspects of the positivist methodology employed by rationalism, it is nevertheless convinced of the importance of the more interpretative approach adopted by reflectivism.7 Realism ultimately avoids the monism of perspective which leads to the self-destructive conflict between the two, maintaining a position which provides an opening for a path between the conservatism that privileges the extant to the exclusion of the possible and the progressivism which privileges the possible to the exclusion of the extant.

### Security Good - Rienhard

#### Securitization’s good – destabilizing the Us/Them dichotomy causes extinction.

Rienhard ‘4

(Kenneth Rienhard, Professor of Jewish Studies, UCLA, 2004, “Towards a Political Theology of the Neighbor,” http://www.cjs.ucla.edu/Mellon/Towards\_Political\_Theology.pdf)

If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one subject to radical instability, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: The effects of this destruction would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; it would multiply ‘little wars’ between nation states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam? Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stability, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia. Hence, for Schmitt, a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies; as Derrida writes, the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for “an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented – therefore monstrous – forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83).

### AT: Impact

#### Squo disproves – the world is getting more peaceful – prefer broad statistical trends

Seth Borenstein, 10-22-11, Huff Post reporter citing Steven Pinker, all around badass and professor at Harvard, “World Becoming Less Violent: Despite Global Conflict, Statistics Show Violence In Steady Decline,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/22/world-less-violent-stats_n_1026723.html>

Yet, historically, we've never had it this peaceful. That's the thesis of three new books, including one by prominent Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker. Statistics reveal dramatic reductions in war deaths, family violence, racism, rape, murder and all sorts of mayhem. In his book, Pinker writes: "The decline of violence may be the most significant and least appreciated development in the history of our species." And it runs counter to what the mass media is reporting and essentially what we feel in our guts. Pinker and other experts say the reality is not painted in bloody anecdotes, but demonstrated in the black and white of spreadsheets and historical documents. They tell a story of a world moving away from violence. In his new book, "The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined," Pinker makes the case that a smarter, more educated world is becoming more peaceful in several statistically significant ways. His findings are based on peer-reviewed studies published by other academics using examinations of graveyards, surveys and historical records: \_ The number of people killed in battle – calculated per 100,000 population – has dropped by 1,000-fold over the centuries as civilizations evolved. Before there were organized countries, battles killed on average more than 500 out of every 100,000 people. In 19th century France, it was 70. In the 20th century with two world wars and a few genocides, it was 60. Now battlefield deaths are down to three-tenths of a person per 100,000. \_ The rate of genocide deaths per world population was 1,400 times higher in 1942 than in 2008. \_ There were fewer than 20 democracies in 1946. Now there are close to 100. Meanwhile, the number of authoritarian countries has dropped from a high of almost 90 in 1976 to about 25 now. Pinker says one of the main reasons for the drop in violence is that we are smarter. IQ tests show that the average teenager is smarter with each generation. The tests are constantly adjusted to keep average at 100, and a teenager who now would score a 100 would have scored a 118 in 1950 and a 130 in 1910. So this year's average kid would have been a near-genius a century ago. And that increase in intelligence translates into a kinder, gentler world, Pinker says. "As we get smarter, we try to think up better ways of getting everyone to turn their swords into plowshares at the same time," Pinker said in an interview. "Human life has become more precious than it used to be." Pinker argued his case in a commentary this past week in the scientific journal Nature. He has plenty of charts and graphs to back up his claims, including evidence beyond wartime deaths – evidence that our everyday lives are also less violent: \_ Murder in European countries has steadily fallen from near 100 per 100,000 people in the 14th and 15th centuries to about 1 per 100,000 people now. \_ Murder within families. The U.S. rate of husbands being killed by their wives has dropped from 1.2 per 100,000 in 1976 to just 0.2. For wives killed by their husbands, the rate has slipped from 1.4 to 0.8 over the same time period. \_ Rape in the United States is down 80 percent since 1973. Lynchings, which used to occur at a rate of 150 a year, have disappeared. \_ Discrimination against blacks and gays is down, as is capital punishment, the spanking of children, and child abuse. But if numbers are too inaccessible, Pinker is more than happy to provide the gory stories illustrating our past violence. "It is easy to forget how dangerous life used to be, how deeply brutality was once woven into the fabric of daily existence," Pinker writes in his book. He examines body counts, rapes, sacrifice and slavery in the Bible, using an estimate of 1.2 million deaths detailed in the Old Testament. He describes forms of torture used in the Middle Ages and even notes the nastiness behind early day fairy tales, such as the evil queen's four gruesome methods for killing Snow White along with a desire to eat her lungs and liver. Even when you add in terrorism, the world is still far less violent, Pinker says. "Terrorism doesn't account for many deaths. Sept. 11 was just off the scale. There was never a terrorist attack before or after that had as many deaths. What it does is generate fear," he said. It's hard for many people to buy the decline in violence. Even those who deal in peace for a living at first couldn't believe it when the first academics started counting up battle deaths and recognized the trends. In 1998, Andrew Mack, then head of strategic planning for U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, said a look at the statistics showed the world was becoming less violent. The reaction from his professional peacekeeping colleagues? "Pffft, it's not true," they told Mack, arguing that the 1990s had to be the worst decade in U.N. history. It wasn't even close. Joshua Goldstein, a professor of international relations at American University and author of "Winning the War on War," has also been telling the same story as Pinker, but from a foreign policy point of view. At each speech he gives, people bring up America's lengthy wars in the Middle East. "It's been a hard message to get through," he acknowledged. "We see the atrocities and they are atrocious," Goldstein said. "The blood is going to be just as red on the television screens." Mack, who's now with Simon Fraser University in Canada, credits the messy, inefficient and heavily political peacekeeping process at the U.N., the World Bank and thousands of non-governmental organizations for helping curb violence. The "Human Security Report 2009/2010," a project led by Mack and funded by several governments, is a worldwide examination of war and violence and has been published as a book. It cites jarringly low numbers. While the number of wars has increased by 25 percent, they've been minor ones. The average annual battle death toll has dropped from nearly 10,000 per conflict in the 1950s to less than 1,000 in the 21st century. And the number of deadliest wars – those that kill at least 1,000 people a year – has fallen by 78 percent since 1988. Mack and Goldstein emphasize how hard society and peacekeepers have worked to reduce wars, focusing on action taken to tamp down violence, while Pinker focuses on cultural and thought changes that make violence less likely. But all three say those elements are interconnected. Even the academics who disagree with Pinker, Goldstein and Mack, say the declining violence numbers are real.

### AT: Alt

#### The alternative’s rejection does nothing – gradual reforms like the plan are necessary to effectuate change

Erik Olin Wright xx-xx-7, Vilas Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, “Guidelines for Envisioning Real Utopias”, Soundings, April, [www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf](http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf)

5. Waystations The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. The central problem of envisioning real utopias concerns the viability of institutional alternatives that embody emancipatory values, but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often depends upon the existence of smaller steps, intermediate institutional innovations that move us in the right direction but only partially embody these values. Institutional proposals which have an all-or-nothing quality to them are both less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose more difficult transition-cost problems if implemented. The catastrophic experience of Russia in the “shock therapy” approach to market reform is historical testimony to this problem. Waystations are a difficult theoretical and practical problem because there are many instances in which partial reforms may have very different consequences than full- bodied changes. Consider the example of unconditional basic income. Suppose that a very limited, below-subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income unconditionally given to everyone. One possibility is that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they offered below poverty level earnings. There may be good reasons to institute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI, and therefore might not function as a stepping stone. What we ideally want, therefore, are intermediate reforms that have two main properties: first, they concretely demonstrate the virtues of the fuller program of transformation, so they contribute to the ideological battle of convincing people that the alternative is credible and desirable; and second, they enhance the capacity for action of people, increasing their ability to push further in the future. Waystations that increase popular participation and bring people together in problem-solving deliberations for collective purposes are particularly salient in this regard. This is what in the 1970s was called “nonreformist reforms”: reforms that are possible within existing institutions and that pragmatically solve real problems while at the same time empowering people in ways which enlarge their scope of action in the future.

### AT: Predictions Bad

#### The use of risk motivate positive responses – empirics

Ulrich Beck, xx-xx-10 Professor of Sociology at University of Munich, the British Journal of Sociology Visiting Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences, and Senior Loeb Fellow at the Harvard Design School, “Climate for Change, or How to Create a Green Modernity?”<http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/27/2-3/254>

Sixth thesis: The political explosiveness of global risks is largely a function of their (re-)presentation in the mass media. When staged in the media, global risks can become 'cosmopolitan events'. The presentation and visualization of manufactured risk makes the invisible visible. It creates simultaneity, shared involvement and shared suffering, and thereby creates the relevance for a global public. Thus cosmopolitan events are highly mediatized, highly selective, highly variable, highly symbolic local and global, public and private, material and communicative, reflexive experiences and blows of fate. To understand this, we have to draw upon the picture of 'Mediapolis' so minutely and sensitively painted by Silverstone (2006) and the picture sketched much earlier by Dewey (1946). There Dewey defends the thesis that it is not actions but their consequences which lie at the heart of politics. Although he was not thinking of global warming, BSE or terrorist attacks, his theory can be applied perfectly to world risk society. A global public discourse does not arise out of a consensus on decisions, but rather out of disagreement over the consequences of decisions. Modern risk crises are constructed out of just such controversies over consequences. Although some insist on seeing an overreaction to risk, risk conflicts do indeed have an enlightening function. They destabilize the existing order but can also be seen as a vital step towards the construction of new institutions. Global risk has the power to confuse the mechanisms of organized irresponsibility and even to open them up for political action. This view of 'enforced enlightenment' and 'cosmopolitan realism' opens up the possibility that the 'manufactured uncertainties' and 'manufactured insecurities' produced by world risk society prompt transnational reflexivity, global cooperation, coordinated responses against the background of 'cosmopolitan communities of risk', so the same processes may also prompt much else besides. My emphasis on staging follows from the fact that my central concept is not 'crisis' but 'new global risk'. Risks are, essentially, man-made, incalculable, uninsurable threats and catastrophes which are anticipated but which often remain invisible and therefore depend on how they become defined and contested in 'knowledge'. As a result their 'reality' can be dramatized or minimized, transformed or simply denied, according to the norms which decide what is known and what is not. They are, to repeat myself, products of struggles and conflicts over definitions within the context of specific relations of definitional power and the (in varying degrees successful) results of staging. If this is the core understanding of risk, then this means that we must attach major significance to media staging and acknowledge the potential political explosiveness of the media. How does this correspond to empirical facts? As Cottle (2009) argues, the release in early 2007 of the latest International Panel on Climate Change report proved to be a transformative moment in the news career of climate change (IPCC, 2007).At first climate change featured relatively infrequently in scientifically framed news reports, then it was contested by a small group of news-privileged climate change sceptics, and finally it came of age as a widely recognized 'global risk' demanding responses from all the world's nations. If IPCC predictions and those of more recent scientific modelling come to pass over the next couple of decades, then climate change may yet prove to be the most powerful of forces summoning a civilizational community of fate into existence.

#### Dystopianism is good – acts as a catalyst for real-world change

Fuyuki Kurasawa, November 19th, 2004, Associate Professor of Sociology at York University in Toronto, Canada, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight,” pdf

Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary (or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).11 Huxley’s *Brave New* *World* and Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, two groundbreaking dystopian novels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like *The Matrix* and novels like Atwood’s *Oryx and Crake* – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts.13 Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s *Handmaid’s Tale* for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

### Util

#### Consequences first.

Issac 2 [Jeffrey, professor of political science at Indiana University, Dissent, Spring, ebsco]

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

## Coloniality K

### AT: Imperialism Bad

#### Western imperialism’s the best out of the choices we have – it checks worse, genocidal forms of empire

Martin Shaw, Professor of International Relations and Politics @ the University of Sussex, 2002, “The Problem of the Quasi-Imperial State: Uses and Abuses of Anti-Imperialism in the Global Era,” www.martinshaw.org/empire.htm

Either there would be a continuing cycle of war, which would have the negative consequences for democracy that other Marxists foresaw. Or the war would lead to the victory of a single 'ultra-imperialism', which would suppress the violent contradictions between Western capitalist states. Ultra-imperialism would lead to a new phase of democratic, internationalist consolidation and give capitalism, for the time being, a new moral superiority. (See the excellent summary of Kautsky's writings in Salvatori, 1979.) / Kautsky's ideas appear prophetic from today's standpoint, although because he was a 'reformist' denigrated by Lenin and the dominant Communist tradition in Marxism, they have largely disappeared from the Marxist canon. Kautsky was wrong on timing and process: the First World War did not resolve the contradictions between European empires and did indeed lead to fascism and a new war, rather than the democratic ultra-imperialism that he foresaw. However, the Second World War did lead to many of the features of the ultra-imperialism that he outlined. The conclusion of the Cold War, with the victory of the Western bloc leading to 'unipolar' Western world dominance, has undoubtedly brought to the fore many of the issues he raised. / In particular, the new strength of a unified, post-imperial, democratised West has given particularly sharpness to his idea that 'ultra-imperialism' would restore the moral and political superiority of capitalism. New Left Review (1999) undoubtedly meant the title of their Kosovo issue, 'The imperialism of human rights', ironically. If, however, Western 'imperialism' was in some meaningful sense concerned with the defense of human rights (albeit among other things), then surely it could claim some kind of superiority over other kinds of rule? And what was the alternative in Kosovo? If Milosevic's Serbia offered only an 'imperialism of genocidal repression' to the people of the province, then surely Western power did represent a priori a superior form of power in this struggle? These rhetorical questions are intended to pose serious analytical points. If Western 'imperialism' is in some qualitative sense 'new', especially if Western power is in a real sense post-imperial, while key non-Western states like Serbia offer not only quasi-imperial forms of rule but degenerate, even genocidal forms of empire, then the analytical, moral and political issues surrounding 'imperialism' have been seriously transformed. In what follows, I discuss in detail both assumptions just proposed, namely the post-imperial character of Western state power and the quasi-imperial character of many non-Western states. But before I do this I want to deal with two further preliminaries: the necessary relation between statehood and empire, and the intrinsic difficulties of 'neo-colonial', 'civil society' concepts of empire.

#### **Under imperialism, every measure of the world has improved**

Goklany 9—Worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for over 35 years. Worked with IPCC before its inception as an author, delegate and reviewer. Negotiated UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Managed the emissions trading program for the EPA. Julian Simon Fellow at the Property and Environment Research Center, visiting fellow at AEI, winner of the Julian Simon Prize and Award. PhD, MS, electrical engineering, MSU. B.Tech in electrical engineering, Indian Institute of Tech. (Indur, “Have increases in population, affluence and technology worsened human and environmental well-being?” 2009, <http://www.ejsd.org/docs/HAVE_INCREASES_IN_POPULATION_AFFLUENCE_AND_TECHNOLOGY_WORSENED_HUMAN_AND_ENVIRONMENTAL_WELL-BEING.pdf>)

 Although global population is no longer growing exponentially, it has quadrupled since 1900. Concurrently, affluence (or GDP per capita) has sextupled, global economic product (a measure of aggregate consumption) has increased 23-fold and carbon dioxide has increased over 15-fold (Maddison 2003; GGDC 2008; World Bank 2008a; Marland et al. 2007).4 But contrary to Neo- Malthusian fears, average human well-being, measured by any objective indicator, has never been higher. Food supplies, Malthus’ original concern, are up worldwide. Global food supplies per capita increased from 2,254 Cals/day in 1961 to 2,810 in 2003 (FAOSTAT 2008). This helped reduce hunger and malnutrition worldwide. The proportion of the population in the developing world, suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1969–71 and 2001–2003 despite an 87 percent population increase (Goklany 2007a; FAO 2006). The reduction in hunger and malnutrition, along with improvements in basic hygiene, improved access to safer water and sanitation, broad adoption of vaccinations, antibiotics, pasteurization and other public health measures, helped reduce mortality and increase life expectancies. These improvements first became evident in today’s developed countries in the mid- to late-1800s and started to spread in earnest to developing countries from the 1950s. The infant mortality rate in developing countries was 180 per 1,000 live births in the early 1950s; today it is 57. Consequently, global life expectancy, perhaps the single most important measure of human well-being, increased from 31 years in 1900 to 47 years in the early 1950s to 67 years today (Goklany 2007a). Globally, average annual per capita incomes tripled since 1950. The proportion of the world’s population outside of high-income OECD countries living in absolute poverty (average consumption of less than $1 per day in 1985 International dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity), fell from 84 percent in 1820 to 40 percent in 1981 to 20 percent in 2007 (Goklany 2007a; WRI 2008; World Bank 2007). Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. In most countries, people are freer politically, economically and socially to pursue their goals as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb and property. Social and professional mobility has never been greater. It is easier to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth in the lottery of life. People work fewer hours, and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time (Goklany 2007a). Figure 3 summarizes the U.S. experience over the 20th century with respect to growth of population, affluence, material, fossil fuel energy and chemical consumption, and life expectancy. It indicates that population has multiplied 3.7-fold; income, 6.9-fold; carbon dioxide emissions, 8.5-fold; material use, 26.5-fold; and organic chemical use, 101-fold. Yet its life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years and infant mortality (not shown) declined from over 100 per 1,000 live births to 7 per 1,000. It is also important to note that not only are people living longer, they are healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite better diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) occur 8–11 years later now than a century ago (Fogel 2003; Manton et al. 2006). If similar figures could be constructed for other countries, most would indicate qualitatively similar trends, especially after 1950, except Sub-Saharan Africa and the erstwhile members of the Soviet Union. In the latter two cases, life expectancy, which had increased following World War II, declined after the late 1980s to the early 2000s, possibly due poor economic performance compounded, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, by AIDS, resurgence of malaria, and tuberculosis due mainly to poor governance (breakdown of public health services) and other manmade causes (Goklany 2007a, pp.66–69, pp.178–181, and references therein). However, there are signs of a turnaround, perhaps related to increased economic growth since the early 2000s, although this could, of course, be a temporary blip (Goklany 2007a; World Bank 2008a). Notably, in most areas of the world, the healthadjusted life expectancy (HALE), that is, life expectancy adjusted downward for the severity and length of time spent by the average individual in a less-than-healthy condition, is greater now than the unadjusted life expectancy was 30 years ago. HALE for the China and India in 2002, for instance, were 64.1 and 53.5 years, which exceeded their unadjusted life expectancy of 63.2 and 50.7 years in 1970–1975 (WRI 2008). Figure 4, based on cross country data, indicates that contrary to Neo-Malthusian fears, both life expectancy and infant mortality improve with the level of affluence (economic development) and time, a surrogate for technological change (Goklany 2007a). Other indicators of human well-being that improve over time and as affluence rises are: access to safe water and sanitation (see below), literacy, level of education, food supplies per capita, and the prevalence of malnutrition (Goklany 2007a, 2007b).

### Access – Hemispheric Energy

#### The plan allows for alternative energy development and prevents the US from juggernauting around the globe for oil – this prevents further human rights abuses and destroys the North South divide

Champain 11 [Phil, Director of Programs at the peacebuilding NGO International Alert, “Changing energy provision – a peacebuilding opportunity?” January]

There is one thing about which we can be certain - efforts to adjust energy provision in ways which maximize the potential for peace and development will fail if the consumer does not become more discerning of the sources and methods of energy provision which most of us take for granted. Over the coming decades, a growing worldwide middle class will undoubtedly put increasing demands and strain on energy provision, which will simultaneously create pressure for innovation into new technologies. And with the expansion of new technologies, the costs of new ways of generating energy will fall. However, removing the political barriers to equitable access to energy provision will not be so straightforward. This must also be part of the new, emerging energy discussion. Fossil fuels, energy provision and conflict Consider the conflict management challenges inherent within the system of energy provision based on oil and gas, as depicted in the flow diagram below. The chart illustrates the difficulties involved in managing energy provision in ways which do not lead to tension and violence. The system creates price hikes in electricity and other oil based products for example, preventing access for many; elite capture of oil and gas revenues keeps power in the hands of an unaccountable few; the withholding of oil and gas supplies enables some states to manipulate others; and the extraction of resources is sometimes only possible if large numbers of people are forcibly moved from their homes. These and other factors can lead to violence and instability, inhibiting development and security for vulnerable communities. Of course, global development and the dynamics of our industrialised society are based on fossil fuels and the model of energy provision which they generate. There are, therefore, many social and economic benefits and the purpose of this paper is not to somehow challenge the whole industrial revolution. Much is being done to improve the governance of this system (for example, Alert’s work on Conflict Sensitive Business Practice) and fossil fuels will remain a major part of the energy mix for decades to come. With this in mind it is important to think about the links between managing conflict and violence and the development of new oil and gas exploration, as states continue to pursue oil, gas and coal as part of their energy security policies. Despite warnings from organisations such as Global Witness, campaigning for world leaders to stop burying their heads in the sand and wake up to the realities of the ‘oil crunch’, oil companies continue to drill for ever deeper oil and gas supplies and states continue to compete for access to these supplies, including in countries with questionable human rights records. The challenge for the fossil fuel energy industry seems to be to ‘clean up’, both in terms of CO2 emissions and in terms of propensity to deepen corruption and injustice. A ‘doubled headed’ challenge you might say. Europe’s thirst for imported oil and gas for example (driven by continued increase in energy demand and the decline in indigenous fossil fuel production) is pushing its member states to strengthen relationships with energy rich but human rights poor countries in Central Asia, arguably cutting across aspects of the EU’s neighbourhood policy and its democratic posture. Meanwhile, on the CO2 front, technology is improving the efficiency of fossil fuel burning and the coal industry (which currently fuels 41% of the world’s electricity) in particular is making strides to become a clean and environmentally friendly resource by supporting new technology enabling carbon capture and storage (a set of technologies to collect CO2 from fossil fuel power plants, transport it, and store it under the land or seabed for hundreds if not thousands of years). The risk carried by this double headed ‘clean up’ agenda is that the ability to develop environmentally friendly technology will drown out the need to support better governance practices. Renewables, energy provision and conflict So what of renewables? Do they fare any better when it comes to questions of access, resilience to political manipulation and elite capture? By comparison with fossil fuels, the renewables market is the ‘new kid on the block.’ Rather than ‘clean up’, the challenge here is to ‘scale up’, with little track record to mark the copybook. Policy is currently orientated towards investment in new technologies which will enable oil to be replaced by renewables but large scale grid systems to remain. Let’s keep the system but put renewables into it instead of fossil fuels. An example of this approach is the Desertec project in North Africa. The Desertec Industrial Initiative (DII) aims to build a renewable energy 'belt' (see map below) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to provide 15% of Europe's electricity by 2050 as well as a portion of the producer countries' energy needs. In addition to being a vast petroleum repository, the Middle East is also the heart of the most potentially productive region on the planet for renewables. It is in this environment Desertec is being developed. But although the project seems to promise part of the answer to Europe’s increasing energy insecurity, there are a number of issues that suggest similar management challenges to those of fossil fuels when it comes to tension and conflict. For example, there is concern about whether the project would be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. MENA is considered largely unstable, (an anti-Western regime in Iran, Shia and Sunni separatist movements in Iraq, rebellions in Yemen, etc.), threatening the distribution of energy both locally and internationally. Furthermore, the energy industry in MENA is either wholly or majority state-owned. This does not necessarily mean Desertec will be too, but the initiative is vulnerable to the involvement of corrupt state institutions, a regional energy industry which is neither transparent nor competitive, and to the absence of a consistent regulatory framework. Desertec is, perhaps, not as controversial as another large scale renewables project however – the Grand Inga Hydro in conflict affected Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Both projects will generate significant energy for export to Europe, but it is the Grand Inga Hydro which is most exposed to the charge of exploiting natural resources of the southern hemisphere for export to the north. This huge hydro scheme, on the site of the world’s largest waterfall, has been touted as a potential solution to Africa’s ongoing energy crisis. With the number of Africans without access to electricity expected to grow between now and 2030, the Grand Inga Project, with a price tag of $80bn, is seen by many as an answer to Africa’s development needs. However, opponents of the Grand Inga project argue that most of the electricity generated will go to South Africa, Europe and the Middle East. As a result, most ordinary Africans will not benefit from the project, any more than they did from previous projects aimed at rehabilitating the existing Inga dams. In fact, these previous, somewhat smaller hydro projects on the Congo River have been noted for the high levels of corruption involved amongst government officials, contracting companies and other profiteers, and for the lack of care shown towards those displaced by the dams. Given the $80bn price tag of the Grand Inga project, its critics fear continued practices of these kinds – which the vulnerable, conflict affected DRC will find hard to prevent - will lead to the further exclusion of African populations from the benefits of electricity and development, to the benefit of small and powerful elites. It is this kind of conflict-insensitive development which can weaken governance institutions, widen the gap between the haves and the have-nots, erode the relationship between the governors and the governed and ultimately lead to conflict and violence. It is by no means certain therefore, that these new, large scale renewable projects will benefit the peace and development prospects of countries already exposed to vulnerability, conflict and weak governance. There are, by comparison, small-scale renewable energy projects, from farm biogas to mini-hydro to thermal solar power. Supporters of these models point out that solar power in its broadest sense of including plant matter, winds and tides is essentially limitless and so, in a concentrated form under local control with falling costs, becomes affordable, accessible, and likely to reduce pressures which give rise to violence. However, the relationship between small scale models of energy provision and the ability of states and communities to manage tension and violence also needs further research and exploration. Now is the time to explore these links – between different models of energy provision and conflict management. As climate change and diminishing supplies of fossil fuels force us to think about where we get our energy from, it is also important to consider how it is provided. Large scale projects such as Desertec and the Grand Inga Hydro are essentially extractive, and arguably continue the practice of contractual arrangements between often unaccountable elites and international buyers and companies. This tends to be to the detriment of local politics and relationships, and the exclusion of local populations. As we are forced to consider a major shift from fossil fuels to renewables there is an opportunity to think about how we manage energy provision in ways which build and sustain peace and development - to go beyond environmental concerns to consider governance ones. Local realities – the case of Mindanao (Southern Philippines) The challenges inherent in developing ways of meeting energy demand in the face of climate change, dwindling fossil fuels, and vulnerability to violence can be illustrated by looking at the case of Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. The gap between demand for energy and its supply is widening rapidly in this resource rich region. By 2014 it is estimated that this gap will be -14%, resulting in rolling power cuts of up to six hours a day. Most energy is provided by hydro power and in particular from the Agus and Pulangi hydro power stations which are located in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The ARMM is the focus of continued fighting and dispute between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) demanding autonomy for the predominantly Muslim ARMM which sits within a predominantly Catholic Philippines. In addition, strong local clans compete violently for the control of economic resources. One of the larger energy companies operating in Mindanao is Davao Energy and Light. This company is proposing to build a 200MW coal fired power station in the South of Mindanao (outside the ARMM) which would go some way towards closing the energy gap. Under pressure from environmentalists and climate change campaigners the company has developed ‘clean coal’ technology which, says the company, would keep omissions within legal limits and deliver energy at competitive prices - one aspect of the ‘clean up’ approach. A site for the plant is being inspected and plans to the council will follow. However, what remains uncertain is the impact such a power station will have on the dynamics of conflict in Mindanao. Being outside the ARMM may make it less vulnerable to attack by the MILF. But on the other hand, it may be seen as being in the control of the rich South, controlled by local political interests, with those in the ARMM losing out on access. Furthermore, whilst the company and the local council are pushing for large scale power plants to impact on the widening gap between demand and supply of energy, there has been limited exploration of increasing the use of small scale hydro schemes, though sites for these are plentiful. What is encouraging is that the company is engaging with local groups and ideas are being generated. There seems to be space for discussion about how this response to the energy question in Mindanao can be linked to peacebuilding efforts. Such discussion will need to involve those with a stake in Mindanao and the ARMM, including civil society, local government and business. If ways can be found to govern Mindanao’s energy provision in ways which take account of the needs and interests of different groups then local governance capacities will be strengthened and improved levels of access to energy as well as security will follow. Conclusion The energy debate is changing in a number of ways. Oil is becoming vulnerable as the primary source of energy. This is due to both (a) dwindling supplies – although the notion of ‘peak oil’ is contested, there is no argument about the fact that oil is a finite resource, and (b) its propensity to produce CO2 at a time when there is growing consensus amongst the international community, the extractives industry itself and the general public on the need to tackle climate change. The long term trend in oil price is upwards, as this finite resource becomes scarcer, carbon taxes are added, and unconventional deposits become more difficult to extract. In response, renewable energy projects (and nuclear energy – which this paper has not touched upon - as a way of both reducing our dependence upon oil and reducing the amount of greenhouse gas emissions) are scaling up, where cost and technology allow. As technology develops ever faster and attention shifts to the huge potential of renewable energy, the possibility of harnessing large quantities of hydro and solar power is viewed by many as both feasible and desirable. The Desertec condensed solar power scheme in North Africa and the Grand Inga Hydro project in the DRC are two leading examples. As one line of thought expands the notion of scaling up, another is taking the energy debate in the opposite direction. With the prospect of no longer being able to secure sufficient supplies of oil, gas and coal to meet increasing energy demand, many are exploring small scale models of energy provision based on renewables. At the same time, the challenge of effective regulation of the energy industry is becoming more pronounced. As some states become more anxious about energy provision, others eye opportunity. The trade-off between human rights/conflict sensitivity/environmental concerns and access to energy resources, for example, is likely to become more common as the need for energy outweighs questions about how this energy is secured and who benefits. The job of energy companies tasked with securing energy resources is becoming more complex. And the energy consumer is caught between need and the increasing risks involved in securing traditional energy sources. In this context there is a need for the consumer, particularly in the northern hemisphere, to become more discerning of how energy is sourced and provided. Changes to the ways in which energy provision is governed (rather than how it is sourced) may emerge as these shifts gather momentum, but this is by no means a foregone conclusion, despite the opportunity and need. The links between energy provision and conflict, particularly in vulnerable regions with weak governance institutions, need to be better understood. As we are forced to change the way we think about energy there is an opportunity to consider how the emerging new pathway towards a different mix of energy sources can also be a path towards greater levels of peace and development. The cost of not taking this opportunity is likely to be a continuation of systems of energy provision which privilege the northern hemisphere over the south, which deny large sections of the world’s population access to electricity and other forms of energy, which leave the populations of conflict affected countries vulnerable to authoritarian masters, unenlightened energy companies and the increasingly energy hungry states of the north, and which make little contribution to the governance challenges the world faces. This despite the key role energy plays in the development of our societies.

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## Coloniality K

### Framework

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

### Perm—Martinot

#### Perm solves best – insitutions of power must look through the eyes of the disenfranchised in order to reform policy

Martinot 04 (Steve, Adjunct Professor of Mixed Race Studies, UC San Francisco, Coloniality of Power, Oct 14, 2004,<http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~marto/coloniality.htm>)

One thing the hegemonic mind can do to dismantle or decolonize the structure of its hegemonism, and thus to free itself from its own colonization, from the scripts institutional oppression gives it to enact, is to see itself through the eyes of the other. This would be an inversion of the DuBoisian notion of double consciousness. Double consciousness, according to DuBois, is the consciousness of the racialized, of having to see oneself always through the eyes of another, in the dominance and derogation of a hegemonic group. For decolonization, it is the hegemonic mind that must see itself through the eyes of those who see it as hegemonic, to see what it looks like to them, and to see what it means to them -- and thereby to confront dominance or hegemony in one's own person.